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Weak technological capabilities in international management and product change led to 
a loss of competitive advantage by Samsung's foreign subsidiaries operating in high 
labour cost economies. These deficiencies also impeded Samsung's establishment of 
effective international production networks in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, Samsung 
came to understand the importance of strategic cooperation between its affiliated 
companies producing end-product and components. 
In 1993, Samsung's top management made a special effort to improve overseas 
production. The rapid formation of integrated production networks in China enabled it 
to facilitate the timely transfer of the parent firm's production capability to the 
subsidiaries. This was partly a result of close cooperation between the group's affiliated 
companies, cooperation which was significantly improved after 1993 and the 
introduction of the new management movement. 
This chapter examines the relationship between Samsung 's technological capabilities and 
international production in China, particularly focusing on production, component 
sourcing, marketing and product design and development in the face of continuing 
global competition. The chapter consists of five parts: (1) an overview of international 
production networks in China; (2) a review of external factors motivating Samsung's 
international production; (3) a description of foreign subsidiaries' key value-added 
activities (4) discussion of R&D internationalisation of established MNCs; (5) an 
assessment of technological capabilities and the growth of Samsung's subsidiaries; and 
(6) a summary. 
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Overview of production networks in China 
Establishing integrated production networks 
From the late 1980s, before diplomatic relations between Korea and China were 
normalised, Samsung started to look for international production opportunities in China 
In 1992, SEC and SEM began production of audio products, speakers and audio decks, 
and computer-related components in Guangdong province. At this time, SEC tendered 
for a government contract manufacturing VCR deck mechanism units at Dalian, but lost 
the tender to Matsushita. 
Table 7.1 Samsung Electronics' manufacturing subsidiaries in China, 1995 
Location Name of foreign Year of Samsung's Product items 
affiliates establishment ownership 
& (operation) (%) 
Guangdong Dongguan Samsung 1990 80 Speakers, audio decks, 
Electro-Mechanics Co., (June 1992) keyboards, etc. 
Ltd (Donp;p;uan SEM) 
Guangdong Huizhou Samsung 1992 90 Audio systems 
Electronics Co., Ltd (Nov 1992) 
(Huizhou SEC) 
Tianjin Tianjin Samsung Apr 1992 100 VCR components (rotary 
Corning Co., Ltd (Aug 1992) transformers) 
(Tianjin SC) 
Tianjin Tianjin Samsung Dec 1993 80 Flyback transformers 
Electro-Mechanics Co., (May 1994) {FBTs), tuners, VCR 
Ltd (Tianjin SEM) drums, heads, etc. 
Tianjin Tianjin Samsung 1994 50 Cameras 
Aerospace Industry Co., (July 1994) 
Ltd (SAl Tianjin) 
Tianjin Tianjin Tongguang Apr 1994 50 CTVs 
Samsung Electronics (June 1994) 
Co., Ltd (TTSECJ 
Tianjin Tianjin Samsung Jan 1993 50 VCRs and VCR decks 
Electronics Co., Ltd (Nov 1993) 
(TSEC) 
Jinan Shandong Samsung 1993 46 Time division exchanges 
Telecommunication (1994) (TDXs) 
Co., Ltd 
(Shandong SST) 
Jiangsu Samsung 1995 100 Non-memory ICs 
Semiconductor (to begin in 
Electronics Suzhou Co., 1996) 
Ltd (SSESC) 
Jiangsu Suzhou SEC Ltd 1995 80 Refrigerators, microwave 
(Suzhou SEC) (to begin in ovens, washing machines 
1996) and air conditioners 
Source: Compiled from company data and author's interviews, 24 -28 October 1995 
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The state run electronics manufacturing finn in Tianjin, Tianjin Broadcasting 
Corporation (TBC), expressed an interest in forming a VCR manufacturing joint venture 
with SEC in 1992. Tianjin has a population of over 9 million, is situated near Korea 
and is strategically located for both marketing and manufacturing. In April 1993, 
approval was given to Tianjin Sarnsung Electronics Co (TSEC) to begin operations, and 
production of VCRs in the TBC factory started in June. Subsequently, SEM joined this 
project, manufacturing core components for VCRs. TBC was also interested in joint 
production of CTV s with SEC and formed a new joint venture. Samsung also plans to 
produce microwave ovens, washing machines, refrigerators and non-memory ICs in 
Suzhou. 
Figure 7.1 Samsung's vertical production network in Tianjin, China 
VCR plant (TSEC) 
Tianjin SEM 
Tianjin SC 
Source: Compiled from company data and author's interviews, 24-28 October 1995 
Samsung quickly established an integrated production network in Tianjin. VCRs were 
produced by TSEC in 1993, core components of VCRs by Tianjin SEM in 1993, CTVs 
by TTSEC in 1994 and rotary transformers by Tianjin SC in 1992. Tianjin SEM sells 
TTSEC tuners and TSEC VCR drums, motors and VCR heads. In addition, Tianjin SC 
supplies Tianjin SEM rotary transformers for the assembly of VCR drums (see Figure 
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7.1). Samsung has thus established a vertically integrated production system, joining a 
number of the group affiliated firms such as SC, SEM, SED and SEC. SEC has also 
established a joint venture producing time division exchanges (TDXs) in Shandong. 
In December 1995, SED decided to produce CRTs for delivery to TTSEC in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong province. SC is also planning to build a plant near SED's subsidiary to 
produce glass bulbs for use in CRT production. In Suzhou, SEC's semiconductor plant 
gained approval for the production of ICs such as transistors used for consumer 
electronics products. These components are also used by TTSEC, TSEC in Tianjin and 
Huizhou-SEC in Guangdong. As Samsung extended its production networks in China, 
small and medium-sized Korean components suppliers increased their operations nearby, 
and they also developed links with other Korean end-product manufacturers operating in 
China- manufacturers such as Goldstar and Hyundai. 
Compared with its activities the ASEAN region, Samsung moved quickly into China. It 
was at 'the front of the pack'- in particular coinciding with the entry of the Japanese 
MNCs. This reflects an aggressive FDI strategy under which Samsung quickly 
transferred and exploited its technological capabilities, unlike the Japanese firms which 
were generally cautious about investment in China. They were concerned that they 
might lose their technological capabilities to Chinese firms and feared that they had no 
real chance of getting a slice of the Chinese market. Another factor motivating 
Samsung's FDI was that the Chinese regulatory environment initially encouraged foreign 
direct investment for export activities, providing a chance to exploit Samsung's mass 
production capability while taking advantage of low cost labour in China. 
The operations of Samsung's subsidiaries in China 
Samsung Corning in Tianjin (Tianjin SC) 
Tianjin SC, which produces rotary transformers, was the first subsidiary in China 
established by Samsung Corning. SC has built up its production capability in rotary 
transformers since the late 1980s (SC 1994). Unlike other affiliates for the production of 
components, Tianjin SC came to China prior to the establishment of SEC's end-product 
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VCR assembly plant. In contrast to SC Malaysia, which produces glass bulbs, there was 
not much capital investment due to the labour-intensive nature of its assembly works. 
Tianjin SC is involved only in the final assembly of rotary transformers, although it has 
now diversified to ceramic filters for telecommunications products. 
SC Korea investigated the prospects for investment in China in 1991 because of the 
increase in labour costs in Korea and the appreciation of the won. Several locations, 
including Beijing, Tianjin and another location in northern China were considered, but 
Tianjin was selected because SEM and SEC planned to set up manufacturing plants in 
Tianjin. Samsung Corning preferred to establish a joint venture with one of the local 
Chinese manufacturing fmns, but no suitable partner was available so SC set up a 
wholly-owned subsidiary. In April 1992 the foreign investment project was approved 
and production began in August of the same year. Initially, all products manufactured in 
Tianjin were exported to Korea because there was no single VCR plant operating in 
China when production commenced. Samsung made the decision to invest in China 
before its Japanese competitors, and production also actually began earlier (author's 
interviews with Tianjin SC, 27 October 1995). 
Production began with two assembly lines with a capacity of 800,000 units. This was 
expanded to five lines in December 1992. From 1993, more sophisticated products 
were added, such as four-channel rotary transformers in addition to the two-channel 
type. Tianjin SC planned to expand production to 5 million units per year (SC 
1994:561). 
By late 1995, Tianjin SC was operating a total of 16 production lines. Most of the 
products are rotary transformers used for VCR heads and the rest are ceramic filters 
used for cordless phones. As productivity increased, the final assembling work was 
gradually transferred to Tianjin from SC Korea. By mid 1995, 50 per cent of the total 
production of rotary transformers for SC was produced by Tianjin SC, and it was set to 
increase to 80 per cent in 1996. 
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All the products made in Tianjin are sent to SC Korea for quality inspection before 
being distributed to customers. As production capacity has increased over time, the 
quality of products has improved gradually, and is now equivalent to those made in 
Korea. SC thus plans to allocate its material manufacturing process, which is currently 
undertaken in Korea, to Tianjin. 
In the early stages, all products were exported to Korea for re-export to Southeast Asia 
and Europe. After local VCR manufacturers started operation, the local demand for 
rotary transformers gradually increased. In late 1995, local market distribution reached 
nearly 30 per cent. Major buyers of Tianjin SC are Tianjin SEM, and Funai, which 
operates in Dongguan, Guangdong province. The supply of rotary transformers to 
Japanese buyers is also likely to increase. Toshiba in Dalian was considering the use of 
Tianjin SC's products, and similarly Matsushita was considering a shift from in-house 
manufacture of its rotary transformers to out sourcing. According to Tianjin SC's 
forecasts, local market consumption of its products will increase rapidly, but local 
market share (30 per cent of total production in late 1995) may not change despite a 
substantial increase in production capacity. As the production of ceramic filters is 
introduced, Motolora and Ericsson will be potential customers. Furthermore, Tianjin 
SC plans to take over from SC Korea's international marketing activities covering 
Southeast Asia (author's interviews, 27 October 1995). 
Almost all materials are imported from Korea because local sourcing is unavailable. 
Although SC originally planned to cooperate with one of the small or medium-sized 
Korean material manufacturers, plans to undertake local production in Tianjin were 
abandoned because Tianjin SC's production scale was so small. As Tianjin SC's 
production increases and its products diversify from consumer electronics to 
telecommunication products, more small and medium-sized Korean component suppliers 
are likely to locate in the vicinity. 
Tianjin Samsung Electronics (TSEC) 
TSEC was SEC's third offshore VCR plant, following the establishment of plants in 
Spain and Indonesia. In January 1993, SEC set up a cooperative arrangement with one 
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of China's state-run electronics firms, TBC. TBC had produced black and white TV 
sets from 1958 and colour TV sets from 1980 before it allied with Samsung. The 
Chinese government approved a 50:50 joint venture between SEC and TBC with a total 
investment of $US 64 million for the production of VCR sets. SEC initially planned to 
produce VCR decks and drums in addition to VCR sets. SEC, however, invited SEM to 
manufacture VCR components specifically for the subsidiary. 
By late 1995, TSEC's production capacity was 600,000 units per year, but there is 
scope for plant capacity to increase to 1.5 million sets per annum. VCRs, which are 
distributed to both local and export markets, are made on the same production line using 
a flexible production system. In 1994, TSEC started to establish PCB and VCR deck 
assembly lines in its factory. Production capability has improved gradually. TSEC's 
defect ratio decreased from 2.1 per cent in 1994 to 1.8 per cent in 1995, and sales per 
employee rose from $US 44,000 in 1994 to $85,000 in 1995. Production increased 
from 173,000 units in 1994 to 450,000 units in 1995. 
TSEC's local content ratio was about 40 per cent until the end of 1994 and is expected 
to reach 50 per cent by late 1995, slightly higher than Samsung Metrodata Indonesia, 
which was established in 1992 for the manufacture of VCRs. TSEC's high local content 
ratio, which was achieved within a short period, resulted from the quick networking 
process which was undertaken between its affiliated companies' subsidiaries such as 
Tianjin SEM and Tianjin SC. Other Korean component suppliers such as Sinheung 
Precision and Jeil Engineering supply deck housing materials and plastic cases to 
Samsung's subsidiaries. Another factor which tends to increase TSEC's local content 
ratio is that high duties on imported components and parts are levied when end-products 
are made with imported components and distributed locally. TSEC' s imported 
components are mostly limited to transistors and integrated circuits used for PCB 
assembly (author's interviews with TSEC, 25 October 1995). 
In 1993, TSEC became the first manufacturer to export VCRs made in China. TSEC's 
long-term objective is to penetrate the local market while targeting the global market in 
the short term. According to TSEC's strategic plan, output is expected to increase from 
180 
450,000 units in 1995 to about 2.5 million sets by the year 2000. About 45 per cent of 
the products manufactured in 1995 were exported to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Australia and the United States, while the rest was locally distributed. One 
of the major export markets is the CIS, which took nearly a half of the VCR sets 
exported. TSEC sells its products under the Samsung brand name in China and had 
seized nearly 30 per cent of the Tianjin's VCR market share by late 1995. TSEC is 
continuing to expand its distribution channels in China. SEC Korea supported TSEC 
with a special promotion fund, but it ceased recently. It is doubtful whether TSEC's 
financial capability is sufficient to establish local marketing networks in time without 
support from SEC Korea. 
TSEC regularly sends engineers from its R&D department to headquarters in Korea for 
some three months' training. In 1995, TSEC's R&D department was placing priority 
on increasing local component sourcing, rather than learning product change capability. 
TSEC planned to produce a new product, a TV-equipped VCR, in cooperation with 
TTSEC. For this, TSEC and TTSEC plan to set up a joint R&D laboratory to improve 
their product innovation and development capability (author's interviews, 25 October 
1995). However, the financially weak Chinese partners may be unable to increase their 
share capital if an equal proportion of capital is to be invested by the both parties. In the 
short term, TSEC is in a better competitive position than Samsung subsidiaries 
operating in Southeast Asia, but this cannot be sustained in the long run unless its 
product change capability is improved quickly. 
Tianjin Samsung Electro-Mechanics (Tianjin SEM) 
SEM gained international production experience at its plants in Portugal and Thailand 
prior to investment in China. In 1992, the current Chinese partner had offered to 
establish a joint venture with SEM, but this offer was rejected by SEM as infeasible. 
The decision to set up a joint venture was made when SEC was planning to set up a 
VCR manufacturing plant in Tianjin and requested SEM to take part in the manufacture 
of core components such as VCR drums, heads and drum motors. In October 1993 
SEM made a joint venture agreement to set up Tianjin SEM with a Tianjin-based 
Chinese tuner manufacturer and the project was approved by the Chinese government in 
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December 1993. SEM's strategy was to relocate some product items which were losing 
competitive advantage in Korea to China. The timing of SEM' s entry into China 
coincided almost exactly with that of its Japanese rival, Matsushita, which established a 
plant in Dalian. 
Initially, SEM held an 80 per cent share in this project while the Chinese partner 
company held 20 per cent. SEM's equity later rose to 91 per cent with the Chinese 
partner holding 9 per cent. Tianjin SEM tried to utilise the existing facilities which the 
Chinese partner company had used for the production of tuners, but had to replace the 
outdated and inefficient facilities with machinery and equipment imported from Korea. 
The monthly production capacity in 1994 was 300,000 tuners for TV s and VCRs; 
120,000 VCR heads; 300,000 precision motors; and 50,000 computer spindle motors 
(SEM January 1994). Tianjin SEM produces all nine product items used for VCRs, 
CTV s and computers. In May 1994, Tianjin SEM started mass production of VCR 
heads, head motors and tuners, and VCR drum production commenced in August the 
same year. Like subsidiaries such as SEM Thailand and Dongguan SEM, Tianjin SEM 
has also actively expanded its production facilities. According to Tianjin SEM's 1995 
plan, total manufactured components have increased to three times the 1994 total. The 
production of particular products has increased rapidly. Monthly production capacity 
during 1995 (between August and December) increased from 200,000 to 300,000 
drums; from 300,000 to 500,000 drum motors; and from 270,000 to 360,000 tuners. 
SEM planned to produce capacitors (condensers) in December 1995 and to increase 
production capacity further. 
Tianjin SEM has endeavoured to achieve scale economies. Its scale of production is 
larger than that of Matsushita in Dalian, where Matsushita currently produces VCR 
components with a capacity of 1.5 million per year or less than 150,000 per month, 
compared with 200,000 VCR drums per month produced by Tianjin SEM. To allow 
early completion of factory expansion, about 30 Korean engineers were dispatched by 
SEM Korea to assist Tianjin SEM to install machinery and equipment and train the local 
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employees. Tianjin SEM also benefited from the employment of local workers with a 
couple of years' experience in the manufacture of electronic components. 
Initially, a Korean manager was directly involved in the management of the local Chinese 
workers, but his role has been transferred to a Chinese manager. It was found that some 
aspects of the Korean operating system such as the incentive system were difficult to 
apply to the local situation so that adaptation and modification were necessary (author's 
interviews with Tianjin SEM, 26 October 1995). Tianjin SEM continues to benefit 
from discussion about the local culture and system conducted with other Samsung 
affiliated subsidiaries such as TTSEC, Tianjin SC and SAl Tianjin. Samsung frequently 
organises seminars in which the six Tianjin-based affiliated companies share local 
business knowledge. Having an integrated production system in a single location allows 
the sharing of information, and this is one of the benefits generated by 'multifaceted 
integration' advocated in the 1993 'new management' movement 
By late 1995, Tianjin SEM exported about 70 per cent of its components to Korea, 
while the rest was locally distributed. Distribution to local CTV and VCR 
manufacturers accounts for about 40 per cent of tuners, and about 15 per cent of VCRs. 
Many of the components which were exported to Korea were re-distributed to 
Samsung' s foreign subsidiaries. 
Due to the relatively weak infrastructure of supporting industries in China, materials 
which were used for component manufacture were mostly sourced from Korea and 
Japan. Although it was not operational by late 1995, Tianjin SEM planned to establish a 
design and development operation by 1996. Tianjin SEM currently maintains close 
cooperation with Toshiba in Dalian. The long-term relationship between Samsung and 
Toshiba has continued in the form of technological cooperation through the exchange 
of technical information between the two SEC subsidiaries and Toshiba's subsidiaries in 
China. 
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Tianjin Tongguang Samsung Electronics (TTSEC) 
In 1994, SEC formed a 50:50 joint venture company with TBC to produce TV sets in 
Tianjin. SEC invested $US 30 million in the TBC-run CTV plant for joint production. 
TTSEC was the largest CTV manufacturer among the SEC-run foreign CTV 
subsidiaries. SEC had accumulated international production experience by running 
several foreign CTV plants. In late 1995, TTSEC produced 800,000 CTVs, of which 21 
inch CTV s were made for the local market and 14 inch CTV s were manufactured for the 
export market. 
Before its alliance with Samsung, TBC' s production of CTV s for the local market had 
been inefficient. It seems that the success of TBC' s VCR production with SEC 
encouraged the Chinese partner to invite SEC to be a partner in joint production of 
CTVs. In August 1994, TTSEC began actual operations. Since then, TTSEC has 
increased its productivity by adopting SEC's technology. 
For TTSEC, the local market was more important than the export market. By late 
1995, it was distributing about 60 per cent of its total CTV production locally, while the 
rest, mostly 14 inch CTVs, was exported to the United States. The Thai production 
subsidiary (TSE) had supplied 14 inch CTVs to the US market, but SEC Korea switched 
CTV sourcing from TSE to TTSEC because TTSEC had to conform with the Chinese 
government policy under which foreign ventures were encouraged to increase exports. 
About 90 per cent of production was distributed through wholesale networks in China, 
but distribution through department stores gradually increased during 1995. The local 
Chinese market shifted from a sellers' market to a buyers' market. TTSEC learned that 
although the local market demand for 21 inch CTV sets accounted for a total of 50 per 
cent of CTV demand, local consumption of 25 inch TV sets steadily was growing. In a 
departure from normal practice, TTSEC' s products were distributed to the local market 
under 'Beijing', the brand name TBC had used since 1938. However, TTSEC planned 
to introduce the Samsung brand name from 1996. TTSEC's marketing department trains 
local Chinese employees to adopt a customer-oriented marketing approach. A Korean 
manager admitted that it was difficult to teach marketing concepts to those familiar with 
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commercial practices in a centrally planned economy. To achieve cost efficiencies and 
economies of scope, TTSEC plans to set up integrated distribution channels in 
cooperation with other affiliated subsidiaries such as TSEC and Huizhou SEC (author's 
interviews with TTSEC, 25 October 1995). 
In the manufacture of the products distributed to the local Chinese market, TTSEC 
purchased almost all its components from local suppliers. By November 1995, almost 
130 local firms supplied TTSEC with components such as 21 inch CRTs, FBTs, 
transformers and cabinets. Transistors and integrated circuits for PCB assembly were 
mostly imported. In particular, TTSEC purchased 14 inch CRTs from the Malaysia-
based SEC subsidiary (SED Malaysia). It appears that components made by local 
Chinese suppliers were not suitable for the manufacture of high quality export products. 
To solve this problem, TTSEC cooperated with Korean components suppliers such as 
Jeil Engineering and Shinheung Precision which operated nearby. 
TTSEC's product design department had a total of 110 designers and engineers, the 
largest R&D function of all Samsung's overseas subsidiaries. According to a Korean 
manager, their design skills were not comparable with those in SEC Korea (author's 
interviews, 25 October 1995). Thus, close cooperation between TTSEC and SEC 
Korea's design and development functions was necessary to improve TTSEC's design 
and product development capability. At the time of interview in November 1995, 
TTSEC's major task was to modify SEC Korea's previously exported product models 
to the requirements of local Chinese customers, taking into account the differences 
between Chinese market preferences and those of the United States and Europe. In 
April1994, TTSEC sent seven Chinese engineers to SEC Korea for joint development 
of 21 inch TV sets. The CTV sets were expected to be introduced into the local market 
in late 1995 or early 1996. For the development of 25 inch, 29 inch and VCR-equipped 
CTV s, TTSEC planned to cooperate with SEC Korea and TSEC. In addition, the 
Beijing-based regional headquarters initiated an integrated design and development 
centre for the subsidiaries in China. However, no relationship was established with 
SEC-run overseas design centres in the United States, Europe and Tokyo. 
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Samsung Aerospace Industries, Tianjin (SAl Tianjin) 
In 1994 Samsung set up a 55:45 joint venture firm with a local camera manufacturer, 
Tianjin Camera. Tianjin Camera began production of cameras in 1956, but closed its 
factory in 1990 because its competitiveness had declined drastically against Japanese 
camera imports. SAl Tianjin took over Tianjin Camera's factory building along with 
their equipment and facilities, but these had to be replaced with equipment imported 
from Korea. Samsung's motivation for this investment was to reduce manufacturing 
costs and to penetrate the Chinese market. SAl Tianjin claims that Tianjin had a 
locational advantage in the manufacture of cameras because of the superiority of the 
local mechanical engineering support industry. In July 1994, SAl Tianjin started 
production. 
In late 1995, SAl Tianjin produced 360,000 units per year, but in 1996 production was 
expected to increase output to 700,000 units. The local content ratio of SAl Tianjin is 
high and there were plans to increase local content to 80 per cent in 1996 from 60 per 
cent in 1995. SAl Tianjin interacts closely with local Chinese component suppliers. It 
purchases almost 80 per cent of its components from Chinese suppliers, with the rest 
provided by Korean suppliers operating in Tianjin. SAl Tianjin is able to access Korean 
suppliers who deliver their components to Tianjin SEM, TSEC and TTSEC. These 
Korean suppliers provide SAl Tianjin with plastic components. Local market sales have 
grown steadily, increasing from 10 per cent of total production in 1995 to 15 per cent in 
1996. The majority of products is exported to Hong Kong, Thailand and Singapore. 
One of the most impressive efforts of SAl Tianjin was to use local R&D institutions for 
the development of a new camera product. To do this, SAl Tianjin allied with one of the 
local R&D institutes. According to Samsung, SAl Tianjin reached an agreement with a 
local R&D institute for the development of a technologically simple camera. One 
Korean executive director stated that a benefit of this cooperation is that the cost of 
camera development in China is about 50 per cent less than in Korea. In addition, SAl 
Tianjin has a long-term plan to set up its own in-house R&D institute in cooperation 
with the local R&D institutes in China (author's interview with SAl Tianjin, 27 October 
1995). 
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Huizhou Samsung Electronics (Huizhou SEC) 
In 1993, SEC established a majority joint venture company to produce audio-related 
components with two partners in Guanggdong, where SEM' s Dongguan plant is 
located. SEC owns 90 per cent of the shares, while its Chinese and Hong Kong partners 
each has five per cent. Huizhou SEC was the second offshore audio plant, beginning 
production of audio products in November 1992. Its capacity in 1994 was 540,000 units 
and it supplied 15 per cent of its total production to the local market. SEC's 
technological capability in the manufacture of audio products is inferior to its CTV, 
VCR and microwave oven production, but an opportunity to improve its new audio 
product design capability will be provided by Lux, a Japanese company acquired by SEC 
in 1994 (see Chapter 5). 
Dongguan Samsung Electro-Mechanics (Dongguan SEM) 
In 1990, SEM was involved in two foreign investment projects, one in Thailand and the 
other in Dongguan, China. In July 1990, SEM established a wholly owned subsidiary, 
Dongguan Samsung Electro-Mechanics, in Guangdong to manufacture audio and 
computer components. Actual production started in June 1992. In July 1992 SEM 
Korea sent trainers to this subsidiary for 70 days to train local employees (SEM June 
1994). Production capacity had expanded by July 1994: from 400,000 audio decks to 
800,000; from 1.8 million audio speakers to 4 million; from 100,000 computer 
keyboards to 300,000. Dongguan SEM invested in this location along with several 
other Korean companies. To meet increasing demand, it built a new plant some 10 km 
from the frrst factory in June 1994. Materials were procured from Korea (80 per cent) 
and China (19 per cent), and the components were distributed to Southeast Asia, China, 
America and Korea (EIAK 1993). It also supplied audio-related components to Huizhou 
SEC. 
Samsung Shandong Telecommunications (Shandong SST) 
Shandong SST is a high-tech FDI project which produces time division exchanges 
(TDXs), which combine telecommunications, computer and semiconductor 
technologies. SST had begun to acquire production knowledge of TDXs from the 
1980s. Production of TDXs increased from one million in 1982 to three million in 1987 
and then to 3.5 million in 1988. TDXs were distributed to the Philippines, Colombia, the 
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CIS and Poland (SEMM May 1993). SEC set up a joint venture company in Shandong 
investing $US 20 million with two local partners (with holdings of 38 per cent), of 
which one was a state-run telecommunications corporation. It produced 370,000 IDXs 
in 1995. 
External factors motivating international production in China 
There are two main external factors which motivated Samsung to invest in China: the 
liberalisation of the Korean electronics market and China's growing locational advantage 
as an export production base accompanied by expanding local market demand in China. 
Liberalisation of the Korean domestic market 
Mter import restrictions on electronics goods in Korea were removed in 1989, global 
electronics manufacturers entered the Korean market, which had been protected for 
nearly two decades. SEC was accustomed to selling half of its products on the Korean 
domestic market. There was no guarantee that Samsung would retain this share of the 
domestic market in competition with established MNCs. Samsung needed to take 
counter action in response to the entry of established MNCs to the Korean market. 
An investigation of the circumstances surrounding Taiwan's market liberalisation 
showed that Taiwanese electronics firms had been seriously threatened by imported 
Japanese products. Samsung's research (SEMM April 1991) showed that Taiwanese 
producers lost significant market share when faced with competition from Japanese 
products. The local market share of Japanese brand products increased dramatically 
between 1986 and 1990 following the liberalisation of Taiwan's domestic market (see 
Table 7.2). 
The Taiwanese experience suggested the possibility that about 50 per cent of Samsung' s 
products which had been sold on the Korean market might be seriously threatened by 
the entry of established MNCs into Korea unless effective measures were taken. 
Moreover, Samsung's foreign investment in the United States and Southeast Asia faced 
serious competition from global players and indigenous firms. This was partly a result 
of problems with the performance of its foreign subsidiaries. Although Samsung's 
production capacity in New Jersey had reached a million CTV sets, Table 7.3 indicates 
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Table 7.2 Changes in market share by product in Taiwan (per cent) 
Origin of brand 1986 1990 
CTVs Taiwan 81.6 22.3 
Japan 18.5 77.5 
VCRs Taiwan 56.7 14.0 
Japan 43.3 86.0 
Refrigerators Taiwan 59.9 28.8 
Japan 35.5 62.2 
Washing machines Taiwan 46.5 19.8 
Japan 48.7 72.1 
Sources : SMM, April 1991 
Table 7.3 Samsung's production in Korea and US exports of strategic products, 
1987 ($US million) 
Korean Production (A) 
CTVs 420.2 
VCRs 511.5 
Microwave Ovens 279.8 
Source: Data compiled from Domicity (1988: 8-27) 








that a large volume of CTV s were still exported from a production plant in Korea. 
Samsung had failed to establish a low cost production base in Southeast Asia quickly, 
unlike its Japanese counterparts. Due to the poor performance of Samsung's foreign 
subsidiaries, Samsung needed to establish foreign production bases which would be able 
to achieve cost efficiencies. 
Improved FDI climate in China with the establishment of export bases 
and growing demand in the Chinese market 
Initially, one of the major motivations for FDI by Samsung was to secure low cost 
production bases in China for exports. The first end-product subsidiary in China was 
Huizhou SEC which produces audio systems and exports most of them to the global 
market. Another example is the production of cameras by SAl Tianjin: almost all its 
products were exported overseas during the early stage of production. Although 
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Samsung continues to shift its strategy from a global approach to a combination of 
global and local strategies, exports still exceeded products distributed in the local market 
in late 1995. Chinese economic reforms promoting exports were the basis of Samsung's 
investment in China. 
In 1979 China started to open up to foreign investment, and exports were encouraged. 
Exports were to be as high as possible. The pattern of trade was to be governed by the 
law of comparative advantage, making use of the international division of labour to 
improve efficiency (Hsueh and Woo, 1992: 57) In 1980, in line with new investment 
legislation, special economic zones (SEZs) along the Southeast coast of China were 
established in Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai and Xiamen. The aim was to attract 
investment from overseas Chinese (Fukasaku et al. 1994) in order to increase exports. 
Preferential tax rates and more favourable foreign exchange retention systems were 
applied to SEZs, and later to the coastal open areas to encourage foreign investment, 
particularly that which was export-oriented (Hsueh and Woo, 1992: 58). In 1983 China 
set out detailed regulations for the implementation of the joint venture law. In 1984 
foreign firms operating in SEZs were given a two-year tax holiday. This also applied to 
14 coastal cities and Hainan Island. These coastal cities included Dalian, Qinhuangdao, 
Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao and Guangzhou. In 1986 China actively encouraged foreign 
investment by the introduction of a law relating to wholly owned foreign enterprises 
and provisions for the encouragement of foreign investment. FDI picked up to about 
$US 6 billion in 1988-89 but stagnated in 1990 due to the Tiananmen incident in June 
1989 (Tan 1995). 
In 1987, China attempted to stimulate export via tax rebate policies and subsequently 
planned to return all product taxes and value-added taxes levied on exported 
commodities via different channels such as extension of specialised credit for industrial 
exports, provision of short-term exchange credits, granting of various types of financial 
and administrative privileges and strengthening of export production bases (Hsueh and 
Woo, 1992: 61). 
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In 1990, the State Council introduced general regulations for the sale and transfer of 
land use rights in cities and towns. Thus, companies and individuals were allowed to 
obtain land use rights and to undertake land development. In 1992 China became more 
open to FDI. In line with Deng Xiaoping's call for further economic reform made 
during his historic visit to South China in January 1992 (Tan 1995), many restrictions on 
foreign investment were relaxed. At the same time foreign consumer goods plants which 
were formerly required to export their products were now allowed to distribute to the 
local market. In addition, local authorities were also given more autonomy to accept 
foreign investment without central government approval. In particular, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992 promoted 
Korean investment in China. 
Table 7.4 Development of a foreign investment climate in China 
Year Major measures 
1979 Introduction of the law on Chinese-foreign joint ventures. 
1983 Enactment of detailed rules for implementation of 1979 joint venture law. 
1985 Introduction of law on foreign economic contracts. 
1986 Issue of regulations for the law on foreign wholly-owned ente:rprises. 
Introduction of provisions for the encouragement of foreign investment. 
Introduction of provisions for the encouragement of Taiwanese investment. 
1990 Enactment of detailed rules for implementation law on foreign wholly-
owned ente:rprises. 
Issue of general regulations for sale and transfer of land use. 
Issue of regulations to encourage investment from overseas Chinese and 
compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao. 
1991 Introduction of income tax law on foreign-funded ente:rprises and foreign 
ente:rprises. 
1992 Relaxation of many restrictions on foreign investors. 
1995 Introduction of new guidelines for sector-based emphasis on foreign 
investment, encouraging sectors such as agriculture, transportation, energy 
sectors and high technology. This reform is in line with the international 
practice of providing sector-based investment incentives (Business Times, 2 
August 1995) 
Source: Compiled from Fukasaku et al. (1994: 53-55) 
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From the mid 1990s, Samsung's strategy evolved from a global approach to a combined 
global and local market orientation. A typical example is Shandong SST, which began 
manufacture of telecommunication products (TDXs) to meet local market demand in 
1994. Later in 1995 Samsung gained approval to establish Suzhou SEC to produce 
consumer electronics goods such as refrigerators, washing machines and air 
conditioners. All products were expected to be sold on the local market. At the same 
time, Samsung's subsidiaries that were initially established for export production began 
to sell products on the local market. By October 1995 about 15 per cent of audio 
systems made by Huizhou SEC and nearly 10 per cent of cameras manufactured by SAl 
Tianjin were sold on the local market. At this time TSEC and TTSEC distributed nearly 
50 per cent of their VCRs and CTVs to the local market (author's interviews, 24-28 
October 1995). 
Samsung' s local strategy was a result of the rapid growth in personal income and 
consumption in China. For instance, demand for colour TV s in the local Chinese 
market grew rapidly, more than keeping pace with the growth of other consumer 
durables. According to a World Bank Report (1990), the rate of TV set ownership 
increased to 13.2 per cent, (50 per cent in Beijing) in 1988, up from 3 per cent in 1978. 
In rural China only about 10 per cent of households have black and white TV s and fewer 
than 4 per cent have colour TV s. As illustrated in the report, annual demand for TV s in 
China has continued to increase: demand for black and white TVs has increased from 10 
million sets in 1988 to 12 million in 1995; CTVs from 14 million to 20.5 million during 
the same period. 
Chinese CTV manufacturers were not able to meet the entire local demand. By 1986, 
according to the World Bank Report, 56 factories supplied about 4 million CTV sets, 
which accounted for about 55 per cent of local demand. The rest was imported. At the 
same time, almost 45 per cent of the CTV s assembled in China was based on imported 
kits. Moreover, VCR import dependency was much higher than that for CTVs. Of the 
2 million units of local VCR demand in 1993, only 10 per cent was supplied by 
Matsushita's CKD assembly plant in China, and the rest was imported (Nikkei Top, 6 
October 1993). 
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There were three problems for local end-product manufacturers: under-utilisation of 
plant capacity, cost inefficiency and low product quality. For instance, the Xie Yan TV 
tube factory produced only 1.1 million units, while international competitors produced 
1.5 to 3 million. The unit cost of a CTV set was 70-80 per cent higher than that of 
international competitors. Due to weaknesses in technological capability, key 
components such as glass bulbs, picture tubes, electronic guns, diode yokes and ICs 
were mostly sourced from overseas. 
In 1985, the price of components in China was 120 per cent higher than that of 
international competitors. ICs and tuners were also nearly twice the price of foreign 
components. China-based firms had to pay about three times the price for Chinese fly 
back transformers than for internationally produced ones. This meant that Shanghai 
factories imported 75 per cent of their transformers from Japan (World Bank, 1990). 
The rapidly growing end-product market and the drawbacks of component production in 
China were particularly attractive to potential investors like Samsung, a conglomerate 
which was able to establish a vertically integrated production system, producing both 
components and end-products by the utilisation of production capability in China. 
Foreign subsidiaries' key value-added activities 
What were the main features of foreign subsidiaries' operations in relation to key value-
added activities such as production, component sourcing, marketing, design and product 
development ? 
Rapidly growing production and adaptation 
SEC-run manufacturing subsidiaries in Southeast Asia found it hard to achieve 
economies of scale in the early stage of their operations. In contrast, the subsidiaries in 
China were able to make maximum use of the plants from the beginning. In November 
1995, TSEC achieved a high plant utilisation ratio, over 70 per cent of the existing 
capacity which was newly built in early 1995, producing 450,000 VCR units. TTSEC 
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grew remarkably in its frrst years of operation1 : it increased its production volume 
from 600,000 sets in 1994, to 800,000 sets in 1995, and to 1.2 million sets in 1996. 
Most of Samsung' s subsidiaries were able to employ local workers who had 
accumulated a moderate degree of production capability in the electronics sector over 
the previous couple of years. Tianjin Broadcasting & Communications (TBC), the joint 
venture partner of TTSEC and TSEC, had been producing CTV s for over 30 years 
before setting up operations with Samsung. The joint venture partners of Tianjin SEM 
and Tianjin SAl also had broad experience in electronic goods manufacture: the former 
undertook the production of tuners, and the latter manufactured cameras. Shandong 
SEC, which is producing TDXs, and a new CRT manufacturing subsidiary at Shenzhen 
are also experienced in electronics goods manufacture (see case studies of Chinese 
subsidiaries above). 
This situation is in marked contrast to Samsung' s subsidiaries which were earlier 
established in the ASEAN region. Most of these joint venture partners had no 
experience in manufacturing electronic goods. In addition, most of the subsidiaries in 
China were not engaged in greenfield investment, but were in joint production with 
Chinese partner companies. Samsung provided up-to-date equipment such as chip-
mounting machines and automatic soldering machines to the Chinese partners who 
lacked such technological capacity. Samsung thus introduced new technology and 
replaced old machinery and equipment with more advanced equipment, guaranteeing 
an improved product as well as higher productivity. 
The subsidiaries in China have also been able to take advantage of the improved 
international management capability accumulated by Samsung's previous operations. 
Prior to establishing TTSEC, SEC had accumulated international production experience 
through its operations in Portugal, the United States, Mexico and Thailand. Similarly, 
SEC gained knowledge in the international production of VCRs in Spain and Indonesia 
1 The three component makers, SEM Tianjin, SEM Guangdong and Tianjin SC, also continued to 
expand their plant capacity. SEM Tianjin concentrated on the production of CTV and VCR 
components as well as computer related components. 
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before TSEC began production. In addition, the subsidiaries in China have easy access 
to ethnic Korean workers who speak both Chinese and Korean language. All 
subsidiaries employ ethnic Korean personnel to lessen the risk of communication 
problems (author's interviews with Samsung subsidiaries, 24-28 October 1995). 
Continuous Adaptation 
Samsung subsidiaries adapt their production system so that they fit into the local socio-
economic environment and to ensure the efficient operation of their plants. TSEC 
installed a flexible production system under which all VCR products are manufactured 
on the same production line, regardless of whether the products being produced are for 
export or local distribution. The system is not exactly the same as the one in the 
headquarters' production plant, but has been modified to fit in with the local Chinese 
environment. For instance, TSEC' s production line is more labour intensive than the 
Korea-based VCR plant, not only because of the different levels of automation, but also 
because of the different skills of the assembly workers. In addition, the headquarters' 
process innovation teams visit TSEC, and other overseas plants and make adaptations 
to the production system (author's interviews with TSEC, 25 October 1995). 
The human resource management system is also subject to adaptation. The employee 
incentive system which was transferred from the Korea-based plant is under substantial 
modification. One of the Korean managers acknowledged that 'at the beginning of 
operation in China, we introduced an incentive scheme based on an individual worker's 
performance. It had worked well in Korea, but we soon realised that it was 
inappropriate in China and led to complaints among some workers. In the end, we 
withdrew it, and the system is under modification in order to fit the local 
environment'. Acknowledging the socio-economic differences between Korea and 
China, most subsidiaries also modified their human resource management strategies so 
that Chinese managers were fully empowered to supervise Chinese workers (author's 
interviews with TSEC and TTSEC, 25 October 1995). 
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Component sourcing: a source of SEC's competitiveness 
SEC-run CTV, audio and VCR subsidiaries in China cooperated fairly well with their 
affiliated component manufacturers. From the beginning of operations, SEC and SEM 
jointly set out international production strategies to enable SEC-run subsidiaries (TSE, 
TTSEC and Huizhou SEC) to purchase the locally made components of SEM-run 
subsidiaries (Tianjin SEM and Dongguan SEM). 



























The component subsidiaries grew remarkably quickly. The production capacity of five of 
the seven products made by Tianjin SEM increased rapidly from August to December 
1995 (see Table 7.5). Dongguan SEM, which produced audio and computer related 
components, expanded its production capacity by establishing a second plant nearby in 
response to increased market demand. Similarly, Tianjin SC and Tianjin SEM grew 
rapidly, making maximum use of their plant capacity. Subsequently, VCRs, audios and 
CTV s made by SEC-run subsidiaries in China became competitive because low cost 
component sourcing was available in the local market. It was anticipated that Suzhou 
SEC, which was to produce microwave ovens, refrigerators, air conditioners and 
washing machines, would be able to purchase competitively priced components from 
Tianjin SEM when it started operations in 1996. When SED's Shenzhen-based 
subsidiary starts production of CR Ts, TTSEC will further reduce its CTV production 
costs. The component subsidiaries achieved optimal plant utilisation despite the fact the 
Chinese market was not large enough to consume all of their components. This is 
because headquarters played an important role in the coordination of China-based 
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Figure 7.2 Samsung's regional production network in Asia: the flow of 
components and parts 
M1: SED Malaysia (CPTs) 
M2: SC Malaysia (CRT glass bulbs) 
I: SME (VCRs and audio products) 
T2: SEM Thailand (CTV and VCR components) 
C1: Tianjin SC (rotary transformers) 
C2: TSEC (VCRs, VCR decks and VCR drums) 
C3: Tianjin SEM (VCR drum motors and tuners) 
C4: Huizhou SEC (audio products) 
C5: Dongguan SEM (speakers, keyboards, etc.) 
C6: TTSEC (CTVs) 




~-) under construction 
C8: Suzhou SEC (refrigerators, microwave ovens, washing machines and air-conditioners) 
C9: Samsung Aerospace Industries (cameras) 
Notes: 1. M = Malaysia, T= Thailand, I = Indonesia. C= China 
2. The two FDI projects in Suzhou (C7 +C8) have not been realised, but Samsung has bought a 
33 hectare Suzhou industrial complex and plans to invest more than $US 500 million into 
integrated electronics products from components to end-products (Business Times 19 
September 1994) 
Sources: SEC (1989, 1995a, 1995b); SED (1990); SC (1994); SMM (January 1988-December 1994); 
SEMM (January 1990-December 1994) and author's interviews undertaken during 1- 15 July and 24-
28 October 1995. 
manufacturing subsidiaries, plants in Korea and SEC-run foreign subsidiaries (see Figure 
7.3). This is in contrast to the poor coordination shown during 1989-92 in the early 
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stage of operations in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 6). Improved coordination between 
headquarters and subsidiaries in China was mainly a result of Samsung's 1993 'new 
management' movement under which success in international production became a core 
strategy of globalisation and multi-faceted integration. 
In November 1995, Tianjin SC was assembling rotary transformers and selling 30 per 
cent of its products locally. The rest was being exported to Korea where the 
components were being redistributed to SEC's VCR plants in Korea and SEC-run 
overseas subsidiaries such as SME (Indonesia), TSE (Thailand) and SESA (Spain). An 
average of 70 per cent of the products made by Tianjin SEM is sent to the headquarters 
in Korea, where some of the products are delivered to SEC Korea plants 
manufacturing VCRs and computers and overseas subsidiaries such as SME in 
Indonesia. Dongguan SEM distributes 20 per cent of its components locally, of which a 
proportion of the audio components is sent to Huizhou-SEC in Guangdong with the 
majority of audio decks and keyboards for computers exported to Korea. 
Tianjin SEM and Tianjin SC distribute about 30 per cent of their total products to the 
local Chinese market, while the rest (70 per cent) is sent to Korea. Local market 
expansion is essential to their future growth under Samsung' s regional strategy for the 
establishment of component manufacturing subsidiaries in Southeast Asia, China, North 
America and Europe. 
Marketing: a combination of local and global strategies 
In the early stages of production in China, Samsung end-product subsidiaries 
emphasised the global market, concentrating on the exploitation of low cost labour. 
Almost all the audio products Huizhou SEC produced between 1992 and 1993 were 
exported. At the same time, SAl Tianjin exported all cameras made in 1994 to the 
global market. The majority of VCRs manufactured by TSEC were also exported 
overseas. 
Growing demand in the local market also benefited Samsung's Chinese operations 
because they were strategically linked with Chinese electronics producers that had been 
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distributing CTVs in the local Chinese market. From the mid 1990s, VCRs and audio 
systems manufactured by TSEC and Huizhou SEC were sold on the local market. 
Although the global market share remained high, distribution to the local market grew 
rapidly from 1995: VCRs (40 per cent), audio products (15 per cent), and cameras (10 
per cent). TTSEC began to differentiate market niches for CTV products to be 
distributed to the specific customers from high income groups (author's interviews with 
TTSEC, 25 October 1995). It is also expected that Suzhou SEC will soon begin 
production of washing machines, refrigerators and air conditioners for the local market. 
In global marketing activities, Samsung's headquarters played a critical role on behalf of 
the subsidiaries. This meant that Samsung's Chinese subsidiaries (except Shandong 
SEC) continued to be weak in the distribution of products to the local market, like the 
subsidiaries in Southeast Asia. 
In Chapter 6, it was argued that centralised international marketing activities inhibited 
close interaction between subsidiaries and customers in international markets because 
this system had been hampered by lack of feedback regarding changing customers' 
preferences in production and marketing functions. Under the local market strategy, an 
alternative approach is required, decentralising interaction between manufacturing and 
marketing functions so that a firm can meet the changing needs of consumers in a timely 
fashion. In a similar vein, the global marketing environment has also changed over time. 
Global market distributors (including both Samsung's own sales subsidiaries and OEM 
buyers) require multi-product models with small lot volumes per shipment because of 
the quick delivery systems now in place, in contrast to the market circumstances in the 
late 1980s. This was demonstrated by the difficulties faced by the Malaysia-based 
Samsung microwave oven plant in adapting to changes to GE's distribution and delivery 
system (author's interviews with SEMA, 10 July 1995, Chapter 6). Overseas 
manufacturing subsidiaries and global distributors have been cooperating more closely, 
but this has brought additional pressures. 
Centralised marketing between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries 
There are two weaknesses in Samsung's inter-functional cooperation and interaction. 
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Firstly, most of the marketing resources and capabilities as well as the decision-making 
power have resided with headquarters. As a result, interaction between the subsidiaries' 
marketing function and the overseas distribution channels - either SEC's own 
marketing subsidiaries or OEM buyers - rarely occurs. This means that there is little 
feedback in the form of 'on-the-spot-information' about changing customers' needs 
relating to the manufacturing and design and development functions of the subsidiaries. 
Secondly, Samsung paid less attention to expanding local Chinese distribution and 
service channels than did Samsung's Japanese competitors such as Matsushita. It is 
important to note that all Samsung's end-product subsidiaries are joint ventures. The 
Chinese partners are mostly state-run companies which lack sufficient capital investment 
to expand local distribution channels. Accordingly, they tend to seek short-term 
performance rather than long-term growth (author's interviews, 24-28 October 1995). 
This might result in a decline in the long-term competitive edge unless additional 
investment on the local market development is realised. For instance, TSEC' s long-term 
objective is to become a subsidiary with a production target of 1.4 million VCRs and a 
local market share of 20 per cent by the year 2000, up from only 4 per cent in 1995. 
TSEC partly depended on headquarters for its advertising expenditure during the early 
stages of operation, but as a newcomer in the VCR market in China, it obviously needs a 
huge capital investment in distribution, service and advertising. Around 60 per cent of 
CTV products made by TTSEC are sold through local wholesale distributors under the 
brand name 'Beijing', but Samsung brand CTV s will soon be sold on the local market. 
This will require additional capital investment for local market development in response 
to measures taken by established MNCs which continue to expand their local marketing 
and service channels. 
Local market development and decentralised marketing activity 
Samsung's 'multi-faceted integration' strategy also reflects the importance of local 
market development. Samsung divides the world market into the four regions in which it 
has begun to establish integrated production networks (see Table 7.6). As a 
consequence, the volume of Samsung products exported to America and Europe, 
important export regions for Samsung' s Chinese subsidiaries will not continue to grow 
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at its current rate because Samsung's UK and Mexico's regional production networks 
will soon serve their own regional markets. More specifically, the Mexico-based CTV 
plant is about to increase its production of CTV s to one million units. Microwave ovens 
exported to Europe from one of the Malaysia-based manufacturing subsidiaries will be 
gradually replaced by products from the UK-based plant, which was scheduled to 
commence production in late 1995. 
Table 7. 6 Regionally integrated production networks, 1995 
Region SEC 
AFTA Indonesia (CDPs, 
region VCRs, refrigerators 
and CTVs) 

















NAFTA Mexico (CTVs) 






























Thus, local market development in China is of growmg importance and requrres 
strategic marketing. For manufacturers to satisfy local market demand and changing 
global customers at an appropriate pace, manufacturing and distribution needs to be 
closely coordinated with moves towards decentralisation. At the least, the subsidiaries 
need to be involved in manufacturing and marketing activities simultaneously. 
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Design and product development: largely dependent on headquarters 
In contrast to the subsidiaries located in Southeast Asia, some of the subsidiaries such as 
TSEC and TTSEC in China possess their own design and development functions within 
the plants. In fact, TTSEC's design and development function is not Samsung's, but 
one inherited from the partner company which was recently taken over by TTSEC. With 
a relatively short history of joint operation, however, it has not been possible to conduct 
independent design and development activities because locally qualified engineers and 
designers are not available. Despite the existence of a local design function, whenever 
TTSEC needs new products, it has to depend on headquarters' design and development 
functions. 
Soon after TTSEC joined CTV production with TBC in 1994, several local designers 
were sent to SEC Korea to develop a 21 inch CTV for the Chinese market. The 
approach taken was to modify slightly for Chinese conditions SEC Korea's previous 
CTV model which was exported to the global market. TTSEC's local designers and 
engineers participated in the project, providing local market information. Despite the 
fact that over 100 local designers were working on design and product development, 
even minor changes in product capability were carried out by headquarters rather than 
the subsidiary. In contrast, TSEC' s design and development department had few local 
Chinese engineers and concentrated on increasing local component sourcing, not on 
product innovation and modification. TSEC also sent its local Chinese designers to SEC 
Korea for training (author's interviews with TSEC and TTSEC, 25 October 1995). 
China-based subsidiaries are more advanced in their design and development activities 
than Samsung's subsidiaries in Southeast Asia. But centralised design and product 
development activities are common features of both production networks. This will be 
an obstacle to product innovation and development capability, which is essential to meet 
changing local customers' preferences. In a unique departure from this practice, Tianjin 
Samsung Aerospace Industry was actively involved in camera product development 
activities in cooperation with local R&D laboratories. It contracted with a Tianjin-based 
university R&D laboratory to develop a low end camera model, at half the cost of 
development in Korea (see case study above). 
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As one manager acknowledged, the electronics goods market in China has been shifting 
rapidly from a sellers' to a buyers' market. It is important to determine the customer's 
needs and to pass on this information to those responsible for design and development 
(author's interviews with Beijing Office, 24 October 1995). This enables a firm to 
shorten product development time and assists with gaining a commercial edge. 
Recently, SEC introduced a new product, Karaoke-TV, to the Chinese market, but its 
sales performance was poor. The new product was originally developed and 
manufactured by headquarters in Korea. Although several Korea-based designers and 
engineers visited China for market research and product planning, sales were far less 
than the forecast 200,000 to 300,000 units. Only about 60,000 units were sold. It 
appears that the product did not really suit the local customers' tastes. This lesson 
shows that China-based subsidiaries are under increasing pressure to develop new 
products near the marketplace where on-the-spot-information is quickly fed back to 
production, marketing and design and development functions. 
It is not always easy for subsidiaries to strengthen their design and development 
functions. Consensus and understanding are always necessary between both joint 
venture partners. There is also a need for additional capital investment and more 
Korean designers need to be stationed at the subsidiary, thus increasing operating costs. 
From the perspective of financially weak local joint venture partners, strengthening 
design and development functions may not be their major concern and interest. The 
current discussion of the establishment of a joint R&D function between TTSEC and 
TSEC exemplifies this problem. 
Decision making undertaken at headquarters has been gradually decentralised to the 
China-based regional headquarters, in line with the 'new management' movement. 
However, most of the design resources and capabilities have remained at headquarters 
or in overseas design centres outside China and Southeast Asia. By November 1995, no 
China-based subsidiaries had established links with Samsung design centres in the United 
States, Japan or Germany, nor was there any interaction with foreign firms allied with 
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Samsung, or the foreign design and development firms acquired by SEC in the early 
1990s. 
R & D internationalisation of established MNCs 
Rapid transfer of technological capabilities 
A number of new global players have entered the Chinese market to embark on 
international production and existing foreign subsidiaries have continued to expand their 
production networks, from end-products to manufacturing components and materials. 
Both Samsung subsidiaries currently produce audio and visual products. The 
subsidiaries, which are also scheduled to manufacture products such as microwave 
ovens, washing machines and refrigerators in 1996, will face strong competitive 
pressure from Japanese, American and European MNCs. 
Japanese MNCs have accelerated the transfer of their technological capability to China, 
while extending their international production networks in Asia. Recent international 
production projects undertaken by Matsushita include washing machines in Zhejiang 
province (Nikkei Top, 14 February 1992); CTVs in Jinan, Shandong Province from late 
1996 with an annual production of 200,000 sets planned (Nikkei Top, 7 July 1995); 
automobile compact disc players aimed at the Southeast Asian market to be produced in 
Dalian from October 1995 (Nikkei Top, 10 May 1995) and pagers in Beijing (Nikkei 
Top, 13 April 1992). The washing machines will be in direct competition with those 
Suzhou SEC is scheduled to produce in 1996 as will the CTVs TTSEC is already 
producing. 
In addition, Matsushita's Shanghai production of microwave ovens and their core 
component, magnetrons, was scheduled to begin in July 1995: the plant has the capacity 
to produce 300,000 ovens, and one million magnetrons annually (Nikkei Top, 6 July 
1994). In spring 1994 Matsushita planned to start production of cellular phones in 
Beijing where Motolora holds 60 per cent of the Chinese market. Matsushita is engaged 
in international production (Nikkei Top, 6 December 1993), while Samsung products 
are made only in the Korea-based plant. Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Co., 
incorporated in 1989, began the manufacture of 29 inch CRTs for the local Chinese 
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market with an initial capacity of 350,000 units a year (Nikkei Industrial News, 28 July 
1993), in addition to the production of 14, 18 and 21 inch CRTs. That amounts to 1.8 
million CRTs annually (Nikkei Industrial News, 21 Aprill992)2 • 
Pressure to deepen production networks and towards decentralised 
R&D activities 
Since the establishment of its VCR deck mechanism production subsidiaries in Dalian, 
which started operations in 1994, Matsushita has been producing VCRs heads, cylinders 
and other core components equivalent to 1.5 million VCRs in China (Nikkei Industrial 
News, 22 November 1993). All nine local Chinese VCR makers purchase key VCR 
components almost exclusively from Matsushita, a VCR industry leader in China 
(Nikkei Industrial News, 22 November 1993). A new joint venture started operations in 
October 1995 producing ICs3 for domestic VCRs (Nikkei Top, 12 September 1994). 
Apart from deepening its vertical production networks, Matsushita has strong bargaining 
power in China for the further expansion of production networks, as a result of its 
alliance with the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television in China (Nikkei Top, 9 
December 1992). In order to support its sixteen manufacturing subsidiaries and one 
sales subsidiary located in China, Matsushita established a direct management service 
network in China and opened offices in 12 provinces, as well as establishing a training 
centre for service engineers in Beijing (Nikkei Top, 7 March 1991). It plans to set up a 
production support system to provide staff training, business consulting, sales and 
services, market surveys and an advertising service (Nikkei Top, 23 August 1994). 
Samsung' s competitive position in China has been strongly challenged by established 
MNCs. While Samsung produces magnetrons in Korea only, Matsushita manufactures 
them locally. Suzhou SEC will only start production of air conditioners in 1996, while 
Matsushita commenced production of 300,000 rotary compressors (the core component 
of air conditioners) in January 1995. Mitsubishi will be producing air conditioners from 
January 1998 and Hitachi will increase its production volume from 400,000 to 1.4 
2 In 1996 SED will begin to produce CRTs in Shenzhen in cooperation with a local finn. 
3 Samsung is scheduled to assemble non-memory ICs in Suzhou (SEC 1995a). 
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million by 1998 (Nikkei Industrial News, 11 January 1995). Because of the strategic 
moves by established MNCs which have maintained not only a vertical production 
network but have also introduced prestigious brand names to the local Chinese market, 
Samsung has been under continuous pressure to transfer technological capability for the 
production of the more sophisticated components and materials. 
Established MNCs have set up design and product development laboratories in 
Southeast Asia, as well as R&D laboratories in China and Southeast Asia which 
coordinate their activities with the China-based subsidiaries. Japanese MNCs have 
continued to upgrade their product change capability through cross-functional 
cooperation and interaction between manufacturing, marketing and service, and design 
and development in China. Toshiba and Matsushita have also started to strengthen 
customer service for home appliances in China. Inter-governmental coordination 
between China and Japan has also increased, with the establishment of a R&D support 
system in China: by 1997 the Chinese Academy of Sciences and MITI (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, Japan) plan to open a China-based advanced R&D 
centre, which will be engaged in developing and manufacturing computer software in 
Zhuhai, Guangdong province. This facility will involve a major financial investment and 
the recruitment of 2,000-3,000 engineers (Nikkei Top, 19 November 1991). 
As noted earlier, Samsung's product innovation and development is not as strong as that 
of its Japanese counterparts. This is due to weaknesses in design capability (see Chapter 
5) and a lower overseas production ratio than that of its Japanese competitors (see 
Chapter 1). This means that more products are dependent on Korea-based production 
than overseas production. As global competition has accelerated, a market servicing 
strategy like that adopted by Japanese firms has been evolving, from export to 
international production (Tachiki 1994). This has put pressure on Samsung's home-
based production, as evidenced in the changing position of Korean-made video CDPs in 
China. The Video-CDP market in China has been dominated by Korean products, 
competing with those imported from Japan. Consumption is expected to increase to 
500,000 units in 1996, twice as high as it was in 1995 (Junja Shimun, 18 November 
1995). Demand for the Samsung brand video-CDPs imported from Korea has far 
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exceeded supply in the Chinese market. One of the main reasons for the maintenance of 
competitive advantage was price. Korean video CDPs are half the price and of a similar 
quality to Japanese brands. More recently, the fast growing video-COP market in 
China has been augmented by the entry of Japanese and European competitors such as 
Sony, NC, Sanyo, Pioneer and Philips (Junja Shimun, 18 November 1995). The 
technological capabilities of these firms - including a particularly high capability in 
design and product development and production systems - are far in advance of 
Samsung's. Japanese firms, which enjoy a strong brand preference in China, have 
started to reduce their price, and they will possibly produce the product in China in 
cooperation with their Southeast Asian-based R&D networks. Local Chinese 
manufacturers are also able to manufacture these products more cheaply, although their 
product quality is lower than that of Samsung. These developments present new 
challenges to Samsung's current and future competitiveness. Whether its market 
position can be maintained will depend on its ability to achieve more sophisticated 
technological capabilities quickly. 
Technological capabilities, foreign subsidiaries' growth and 
global competitiveness 
From the beginning of its operations in China, Samsung organised international 
production in an effective and timely manner. The pace of intemationalisation was 
greatly accelerated by the close cooperation between Samsung' s affiliated companies. 
Such cooperation was achieved by overcoming problems associated with the firm's 
uncoordinated organisational culture, an administrative inheritance from the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Close cooperation between SEC and SEM, and between SC and SED allowed all 
available technological capabilities to be transferred to newly established or existing 
production subsidiaries. The 1993 organisational reform became a driving force which 
accelerated Samsung' s intemationalisation process. Of ten foreign investment projects 
in China, eight were realised after 1993. With upgraded technological capabilities and 
fairly well designed strategies, Samsung was able to transfer and exploit its advanced 
production capability quickly. In China, a model for this well coordinated and 
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integrated production system was formed in Tianjin, China. As a result, overseas 
production ratios increased rapidly, from 25 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in 1995, the 
highest among Korean electronics firms (see Table 7 .8). 
In contrast to Samsung's affiliated subsidiaries in Southeast Asia, both end-product 
makers and component manufacturers in China grew rapidly. For instance, TTSEC 
achieved substantial growth, and it is expected to be one of the most profitable of 
SEC's overseas manufacturing subsidiaries in spite of its short period of operation. By 
the end of 1995, TSEC's plant utilisation ratio was also satisfactory in spite of having 
less than a year's operational experience at the new plant. Tianjin SEM and Tianjin SC 
have also enjoyed fast growth. 
Close cooperation between affiliated companies 
The first reason for Samsung 's quick internationalisation and good performance in 
Chinese foreign production is that there was close cooperation between Samsung's 
affiliated companies and between the different business divisions within each firm. Local 
links between Samsung's end-product makers and component subsidiaries were made 
quickly, and end-product subsidiaries were able to purchase cheap, high quality 
components from their affiliated component subsidiaries from the beginning of 
operations. Tianjin SEM, a component subsidiary, and TSEC, a VCR manufacturer, 
started production at almost the same time. TSEC and TTSEC faced no difficulties in 
pmchasing local components nearby. In addition, Tianjin SEM had no difficulties in 
pmchasing rotary transformers, one of the core components making VCR heads, from 
Tianjin SC, which is located nearby. This contrasted with the experience of TSE in 
Thailand, which had to wait for three to four years to purchase components from local 
affiliated components subsidiaries (see Table 7.9). 
To achieve economies of scale, the affiliated component suppliers used intra-firm 
coordination between China and Korea to devise a strategic plan prior to 
implementation of their foreign investment plans. Given that end-product subsidiaries 
were not capable of pmchasing all components produced by affiliated component 
subsidiaries, a large number of components were re-exported to Korea and distributed 
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to other affiliated end-product makers (author's interviews with Tianjin SEM and 
Tianjin SC, 26-28 October 1995). The international competitiveness of these subsidiaries 
was challenged by technologically strong MNCs operating in low cost supply bases in 
· Southeast Asia The supply of high quality, low price components by the affiliated 
component subsidiaries became a source of competitive advantage for SEC-run 
subsidiaries in China 
Table 7. 7 Overseas production ratios of Korean electronics firms, 1994-95 
1994 1995 
Overseas Amount Overseas Amount 
production ratio ($US million) production ratio ($US million) 
(per cent) (per cent) 
Samsung 25 1,100 40 1,900 
LG 10 640 13 1,050 
Daewoo 13.4 430 23.8 1,000 
Source: Dong- A Ilbo: 15 December 1995 
In addition, cooperation between SEC's different business units allowed quick transfer 
of technological capability. The Suzhou-based home appliance project is an example. 
SEC's home appliance business division wanted to locate a plant in China, but the 
Chinese government responded negatively to this FDI project because China had a 
preference for Samsung to transfer sophisticated technological capabilities rather than 
low technology. Subsequently, SEC's semiconductor business chose Suzhou as a 
location for IC production in order to coordinate foreign investment with its home 
appliance business division. Because of the link with IC production, the Chinese 
government approved Samsung 's investment in the home appliance manufacturing plant 
in Suzhou (author's interview with Samsung Beijing Office, 24 October 1995). 
Quick transfer of technological capabilities 
A further second reason for Samsung 's successful internationalisation in China was the 
rapid transfer of its technological capabilities to its China-based subsidiaries. Samsung 
adopted an aggressive technology transfer strategy in China, in contrast to the defensive 
one it adopted in Southeast Asia. More sophisticated technological capabilities were 
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transferred to China than was the case in Southeast Asia. For instance, VCR component, 
TDX and IC manufacturing technological capabilities were transferred to China, but 
they have not yet been transferred to ASEAN countries. 
Table 7.8 Comparison of subsidiaries' performance: TSE in Thailand and 
TTSEC in China 
1st year 2nd year 3rdyear 
TSE TTSEC TSE TTSEC TSE TTSEC 
Plant utilisation ratio (%) a 20 65 30 100 40 120 
Availability of locally sourced No Yesb No Yes No Yes 
CRTs 
Availability of locally sourced No Yes No Yes No Yes 
FBTs, tuners 
Availability of design and No Yes No Yes No Yes 
development function within 
subsidiary 
Notes: 
a TSE's initial plant capacity was 500,000 and CTV production started in 1989, while TTSEC's 
capacity was 800,000 and began production in 1994. Information on TSE' s plant utilisation ratio is 
based on SEC monthly magazine and that of TTSEC is based on author's interviews, 24-28 October 
1995. 
b TTSEC was able to purchase low cost 14 inch CRTs made by SED Malaysia, one of the affJliated 
subsidiaries based in Southeast Asia. 
Source: Compiled from author's interviews, 1-15 July and 24-28 October 1995 and SMM (various 
years). 
The timing of the transfer of VCR and IC technology through foreign direct investment 
to China was nearly the same as that of Japanese firms such as Matsushita and Toshiba 
(see Ohta et al. 1994). In addition, the technological capabilities for VCR head, drum 
and motor production represent relatively new technologies, and those of TDX require 
more sophisticated production utilising computer, telecommunication and 
semiconductor technology. 
To regain its competitive advantage, Samsung emphasised 'speed-based competition' 
through the quick transfer of its technology to overseas subsidiaries. In so doing, 
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Samsung developed strategic alliances with Chinese manufacturers by way of joint 
production, rather than greenfield foreign investment. This enabled Samsung to make 
optimum use of its production capability in cooperation with Chinese partners who had 
prior experience in manufacturing electronics goods. This method of operation by 
Samsung in China is different from its approach in Southeast Asia, where Samsung 
cooperated with local companies which had no prior experience in electronics 
production and were mostly dependent on greenfield investment. 
Moreover, the Chinese subsidiaries interact laterally with headquarters. This allows 
quick technology transfer through close cooperation between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Unlike the Southeast Asian production subsidiaries, the head of each SEC-
run subsidiary in China is an executive director rather than a manager. As a 
consequence, Samsung' s foreign subsidiaries are able to exercise greater bargaining 
power in interacting with headquarters. 
R&D internationalisation and foreign subsidiaries' innovation 
Samsung's relatively good performance in China is due partly to the rapid improvement 
in the production capability of its subsidiaries. This may not seem difficult but there were 
challenges. Chinese joint venture partners had long been operating with technologically 
out-dated machinery and equipment, under a centrally controlled economic system. To 
a large extent, the competitive advantage of Samsung's subsidiaries stems from the 
introduction of efficient production systems, not from superior product innovation, 
product design and development capability, or from strategic marketing. Because of 
the small and temporary nature of new MNCs' technological capabilities, production 
capability alone cannot be a source of sustainable competitiveness. It can easily be 
matched by the Chinese manufacturing companies unless it is complemented by product 
and process change capability. 
The lesson learnt from the divestment of Samsung's US-based CTV subsidiary (see 
Chapter 4) was that quality production performance would not necessarily guarantee the 
sustainable competitiveness of overseas manufacturing subsidiaries. Samsung's CTV 
subsidiary, with a weak product change capability, was forced to withdraw from the 
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United States because its temporary competitive advantage quickly evaporated when 
Southeast Asia-based manufacturers were able to imitate it. 
Given the acceleration of global competition, Samsung might still not place a sufficiently 
high priority on the improvement of product change capability in China Samsung's 
operations are still mainly concentrated on the exploitation of its production capability, 
and do not truly focus on the creation and improvement of a 'difficult-to-imitate 
technological capability'. The unsuccessful introduction of Karaoke TV into the Chinese 
market shows that the production function there needs to interact more closely with 
local design and development and marketing functions. 
As technologically strong MNCs continue to intemationalise their R&D to East Asia, 
Samsung's weak product change capability is expected to come under strong pressure. 
In spite of decentralised relations between headquarters and subsidiaries as a result of 
the 1993 'new management' movement, Samsung's R&D intemationalisation did not 
proceed as quickly as that of other established MNCs. This is probably because of the 
relatively immature nature of its design and product development capability (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). 
It is expected that there will be increased demand for various kinds of electronics 
products on the Chinese market. The Chinese market features simultaneous demand for 
black and white TV s, colour TV s and wide screen TV s. A firm with a superior product 
change capability has an advantage in penetrating the local market because it can meet 
different customers' preferences quickly and provide a rich product mix. Since 
indigenous firms are expected to increase their production capability quickly, a narrow 
focus on a single group of customers with standardised products will lead to problems 
in maintaining competitive advantage, as was the case in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 6). 
To cope with technologically superior Japanese, European and American electronics 
MNCs which continue to upgrade their own design and development capability in the 




The rise of Samsung's international production in China was closely associated with the 
1993 organisational reform and took place under conditions of growing global 
competition. Unlike the tardy international production undertaken during the early 
stages of investment in Southeast Asia, Samsung accelerated its internationalisation in 
China. Samsung' s motivation for undertaking foreign investment was not only to 
establish a low cost production base for exports but also to take advantage of the 
growing local market demand, as well as to cope with the liberalisation of the Korean 
market on which Samsung was dependent for nearly half its sales. The two strategies of 
'globalisation and 'multi-faceted integration' became a basis for Samsung's international 
expansion, and they were strongly backed by top management. 
Like the Southeast Asian subsidiaries, SEC subsidiaries in China mostly centred on 
production activities, while design and product development were dependent on SEC 
Korea. The relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries continued to be 
centralised. 
Samsung's subsidiaries improved their production capability because most of the joint 
venture firms had prior experience in the manufacture of electronics goods. The 
upgrading of product change capability proceeded slowly. This was mostly because of 
the relatively short period of operation but it was also due to transfer-capability 
constraints in design and product development. The international competitiveness of 
end-products made by Samsung's subsidiaries in the region was largely derived from 
cost efficiencies gained by affiliated component subsidiaries which achieved economies 
of scale, partly because of the close cooperation between headquarters and subsidiaries 
which was in turn linked to an improved international management capability. 
SEC-run subsidiaries in China, unlike the Southeast Asia-based subsidiaries, achieved 
satisfactory production performance. This performance was dependent on production 
capability, rather than product innovation or development. Established MNCs in China 
invested in R&D, enabling the quick transfer of design and development capability. At 
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the same time, their foreign subsidiaries interacted with local and global R&D networks 
to improve their product change capability. 
To sustain its international competitiveness, Samsung intends to establish a regionally 
integrated production system. Under such a system, production supporting activities 
such as marketing and R&D should be undertaken near the production plants as well as 




The case of Samsung suggests that the technological capability of a new MNC is an 
important factor influencing its strategic behaviour in foreign direct investment. Other 
important influences include external factors such as the international trade environment, 
factor costs and domestic and international competitors. In the face of global 
competition, it is important for a new MNC to achieve cost efficiency while upgrading its 
technological capability. Whether the subsidiaries of new MNCs perform well or not in 
foreign locations depends on how quickly they learn and improve on the technological 
capabilities necessary for survival in a changing market. Weak technological capability is 
a major constraint on a new MNC competing effectively with established MNCs. 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the study, discusses the dynamics of a new 
MNC's international production and the elements of success and failure in international 
production by a new MNC. It considers the policy and strategic implications for new 
MNCs and for developing countries in the Asia Pacific region. There is also a discussion 
of the limitations of the study and some suggestions for future research directions. 
Main findings 
Samsung's acquisition and development of technological capabilities 
The major sources for the acquisition of technological capabilities by Samsung have 
changed over time. Foreign joint venture partners were the main source of technological 
capabilities during the 1970s; foreign licences, in-house R&D centres and foreign R&D 
laboratories dominated in the 1980s; and strategic alliances, and the acquisition and use 
of foreign design houses were the main sources of technology in the 1990s. Samsung's 
learning priorities also shifted from assembly capability in consumer electronics 
production, to enhanced capability in DRAM production in the 1980s, followed by an 
emphasis on capability in design and product development and international management 
in the 1990s. 
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For over two decades, during the 1970s and the 1980s, Samsung focused on improving 
its production capability through 'learning-by-doing' while forming alliances with foreign 
OEM buyers who provided product designs and access to the international market. This 
resulted in a high standard of production capability but relatively weak design and 
product development capacity. The historical development of Samsung's technological 
capabilities indicates that Samsung mastered an 'easy-to-learn technological capability' 
frrst and postponed its acquisition of 'difficult-to-learn technological capabilities' such as 
product design and development. This eventually exposed a weakness in product 
differentiation when strategy shifted from a global to a combination of global and local 
strategies in the mid 1990s. 
Relationship between Samsung's technological capability and 
international production 
In the early stages of Samsung's international expansion, from 1969 to 1982, SEC 
established two foreign subsidiaries, a US marketing subsidiary and a CTV plant based in 
Portugal. One of the objectives of these two foreign investment ventures was to 
complement SEC's technological weaknesses by acquiring international management 
experience prior to investment in the United States. Samsung's choice of foreign 
location was affected by Goldstar's moves in 1978 and 1981, but it was also influenced 
by Samsung's conservative organisational culture. Under external pressure to invest 
overseas, Samsung sought to gain international production experience in Portugal, while 
Goldstar established a CTV plant in the United States without any prior experience of 
international production. 
In the mid 1980s, Samsung's strength was in its mass production capability, but it lacked 
capability in product change and international management As export markets were 
threatened by import barriers erected by the United States and Europe, Samsung 
established production plants in high labour cost economies to avoid tariffs. This was 
viewed as a means of securing its existing export markets in spite of its weakness in 
product change capability. In the late 1980s, Samsung extended its overseas production 
to Thailand and Mexico because its plants in Korea, the United States and Europe faced 
difficulties in sustaining competitiveness. As before, Samsung followed Golds tar's lead 
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in an attempt to defend its established export markets. In addition to the establishment 
of overseas production plants, Samsung established an R&D laboratory in the United 
States in a bid to gain DRAM technology that was difficult to acquire in Korea. This 
was Samsung 's first attempt to invest overseas as a means of expanding its R&D 
capacity. 
In the 1990s, Samsung's international expansion was closely associated with the 
exploitation and creation of technological capabilities in response to developments in 
both global and regional markets In the light of the imbalance between its advanced 
production capability and its weak product change capability, Samsung attempted to 
exploit its mature production capability through overseas production subsidiaries in low 
labour cost economies while setting up overseas R&D and design centres in the United 
States and Europe to improve its product change capability. In addition, Samsung 
established regionally integrated production bases, transferring the vertically integrated 
production system of its Korean operations overseas. This strategy arose from 
Samsung's two strategic pillars of 'gobalisation' and 'multi-faceted integration'. 
Samsung's aim was to maintain its competitive advantage in production capability, while 
improving capabilities in international management and design and product innovation. 
In an environment of accelerated global competition, Samsung's international expansion 
was intended to create a 'difficult-to-imitate' technological capability, alongside the rapid 
exploitation of its mature production capability. 
Declining international competitiveness, technological capability and 
strategic change 
Samsung's international competitive advantage, particularly in consumer and industrial 
products, declined during 1989-93. There were three major reasons for this, particularly 
m consumer and industrial electronics (with the exception of DRAMs and their 
components). They can be viewed from the perspective of Samsung's trajectory of 
technological acquisition and development. 
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Firstly, Samsung was over-dependent on its foreign OEM buyers providing it with 
designs and entry to the international market. In its alliance with OEM buyers, Samsung 
had no difficulty in maintaining international competitiveness until the mid 1980s. During 
this stage when home-based production dominated, the OEM buyers' strength in design 
and international marketing fitted in well with the strength of Samsung' s mass production 
capability. However, the advantage of location in Korea declined as a result of currency 
appreciation and increased labour costs, and alliances between Samsung and its OEM 
buyers faltered as Southeast Asia-based manufacturers became more competitive than 
Samsung. Its competitors in Southeast Asia, mostly established MNC subsidiaries, were 
producing product lines similar to those of Samsung in Korea by using low cost 
Southeast Asian labour. 
Secondly, Samsung' s US and European production subsidiaries did not operate 
successfully in the 1980s. This was caused by a lack of technological capability in 
product change, poor linkages with local component suppliers. Due to the weakness of 
its product change capability, the US-based CTV plant was unable to introduce and 
develop the new products which were demanded by US customers when Samsung's 
standardised and low end CTVs became uncompetitive. Moreover, SEC failed to 
establish links with local component suppliers or set up local suppliers, despite the fact 
that affiliated component manufacturers were technologically able to invest overseas. 
This created an additional burden, since SEC was faced with increased production costs 
when the United States imposed levies on imported CTV components from Korea. 
The third reason for SEC's decreasing international competitiveness was its lack of 
international management capability, for instance, the lack of coordination between 
headquarters and subsidiaries, and between SEC and its affiliated component suppliers, 
particularly in the early stages of international expansion in the ASEAN region. The pace 
of investment in Southeast Asia was slow because Samsung's affiliated firms invested 
independently, without close cooperation. SEC's technology transfer to the region 
proceeded in a piecemeal fashion despite the fact that there was an urgent need to exploit 
its mature production capability quickly in these low cost production bases. Samsung 
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took longer to improve its subsidiaries' production capabilities than did its Japanese 
counterparts. 
In the early 1990s, Samsung's top management realised that unsuccessful international 
production was one of the major reasons for its decreasing international competitiveness. 
There was no guarantee that Samsung would regain its competitiveness simply by 
maintaining its production capability in Korea and overseas and without creating a 
'difficult-to-imitate' capability. This capability was necessary to survive in an era of 
increasing global competition and the emergence of the regional trading blocs of NAFT A 
and the European Union. This caused Samsung to change its strategies, adopting the 
two important guidelines of 'globalisation' and 'multi-faceted integration'. These were 
driven by the 'new management' movement in 1993, and led to the rapid establishment of 
international production networks in China. These networks were strategically designed 
to incorporate close cooperation with affiliated companies so that Samsung could quickly 
establish several manufacturing plants producing end-products as well as components. 
After the 1993 organisational reform, cooperation between Samsung's affiliated firms 
improved significantly and this was an important means whereby the firm started to 
regain its international competitiveness. 
Operational behaviour and competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries 
in the ASEAN region and China 
To improve the production capability of the subsidiaries, many local employees were 
dispatched to Korea for training. Samsung' s headquarters became an important source 
for the development of the subsidiaries' production capability. In Southeast Asia, the 
plant utilisation ratio was in general low in the early stages of operation because 
production capability improved only slowly. In contrast, the China-based subsidiaries 
quickly achieved optimal utilisation of plant capacity. This is one indication of the 
difference between Samsung's technological capabilities in the two regions. An 
important aspect of this difference was that Samsung established joint ventures with local 
firms previously operating in the field of electronics manufacture in China, but this was 
not the case for most of its Southeast Asian subsidiaries. 
219 
Samsung's end-product subsidiaries purchase many of their components from affiliated 
companies which produce standardised components, achieving economies of scale. The 
international competitiveness of Samsung's component suppliers derives from 
cooperation with mainly Japanese subsidiaries operating in the region; for instance, 
Japanese CTV subsidiaries purchase a great number of components from Samsung's 
component suppliers. Unlike Samsung's end-product subsidiaries, component 
subsidiaries have grown substantially since they do business with both non-Samsung 
production networks and Samsung networks in NAFTA and the EU. 
Most of Samsung's end-products made in Southeast Asia are sold on the global market, 
but distribution to the local market has grown rapidly since the mid 1990s. Samsung has 
expanded more aggressively into the local markets as their importance has grown. In 
China and the ASEAN region, Samsung now sells a considerably large share of its end-
products on the local markets, while distributing its products globally. 
Because of the centralised nature of the relationship between headquarters and the 
subsidiaries, Samsung 's subsidiaries in ASEAN and China have yet to establish 
independent design and product development capacity. Samsung's headquarters 
undertake even minor product changes for subsidiaries in the region because of their 
weakness in design and product modification. It was only after 1993 that Samsung 
started to carry out R&D investment in the region, while the Japanese MNCs developed 
their regional R&D capacity more rapidly. 
The competitiveness of Samsung's end-product subsidiaries has largely been dependent 
on the supply of low cost standardised components from affiliated suppliers rather than as 
a result of strengths in design, product adaptation and development. It is not a reflection 
of close coordination between different business functions such as production, marketing 
and design and product development. These are classified as 'difficult-to-imitate 
technological capabilities', and Samsung had not placed priority on the development of 
these capabilities after 1969. There were two main reasons why these capabilities needed 
to be improved. The first was that Samsung' s strength in producing standardised low 
end-products was not sufficient to maintain its international competitive advantage due to 
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changes in the market, the growing importance of local markets in the ASEAN region 
and China and rapidly changing markets in the United States and Europe. The second 
was that established MNCs producing products similar to those of Samsung in the region 
had established regional R&D bases. As a result, their design and product development 
capabilities improved rapidly, and they were able to coordinate different business 
functions within or near their production bases (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
The story of Samsung- as a representative of new MNCs in general and of major 
Korean electronics finns in particular- suggests a number of general conclusions. 
• A firm's competitive advantage stems not only from low cost production but also from 
the development of its technological capabilities. Technological capabilities must be 
continually improved to maintain a competitive edge. 
• Technological capabilities are important sources of competitive advantage. They 
embrace a fum's key functional activities (production, procurement, marketing and 
R&D), its organisational and managerial capacity, as well as its international 
management capability. The acquisition and improvement of firm-specific technological 
capabilities require close coordination and interaction. Unlike established MNCs, the 
technological capabilities of new MNCs, specifically major Korean electronics firms, 
tend to be weak in product change, international marketing and management. 
• FDI by Korean electronics firms in Southeast Asia and China was undertaken as 
Korea's locational advantage declined, while at the same time, the locational advantage 
of the host countries increased. These advantages included low-cost labour and 
increasing local and regional market demand. The ownership advantage of Korean 
firms is their mass production capability - an 'easy-to-imitate' technological 
capability. 
• As the world electronics industry has been exposed to global competition, the 
competitive position of Korean electronics firms has been challenged, mostly by 
technologically strong global players. From the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, Korean 
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electronics firms were forced to compete with established MNCs in global markets 
because both parties started to produce similar product lines in the same markets. 
·• The overseas production activities of Korean electronics firms still lag behind their 
Japanese counterparts in the developing countries of Southeast Asia. Korean firms 
were originally slow to engage in international production, but they are now rapidly 
catching up with Japan and have developed a fairly sophisticated regional division of 
labour. 
• Korean component subsidiaries supply a surprisingly large share of the parts and 
components they produce in Southeast Asia and China to non-Korean firms, 
particularly Japanese affiliates operating in the region. Unlike the Japanese international 
production affiliates, at least until the late 1980s, Korean affiliates in the region have 
been open to transactions with outsiders right from the beginning. In other words, they 
are not as dependent on Korean firms as were their Japanese counterparts on the 
Japanese affiliates in the region. The openness of the transactions of Korean affiliates in 
the region was due to their lack of technological monopoly, in contrast to the earlier 
technological monopoly held by established MNCs. 
• The overseas subsidiaries of Korean electronics firms are weak in design and 
development capability. This is in contrast to that of established MNCs which have 
increasingly established design, research and product development bases in the ASEAN 
region and China in order to upgrade their product change capability. 
Changing motivations of new MNCs in international production 
The experience of Samsung indicates that foreign direct investment by new MNCs 
distributing a large share of standardised products to export markets is critically affected 
by changes in three factors: the international trade environment; factor costs; and the 
strategies of competitors. A point particular to a new MNC is that its 'small and 
temporary' firm-specific advantage - weak technological capabilities relative to 
established MNCs- is a key factor determining its strategic behaviour. 
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In the early to mid 1980s, Korean electronics companies first engaged in investment in 
industrialised countries that imported a large share of Korean TV sets. This was tariff-
jumping FDI such as the investment made in the United States and Europe, motivated by 
the anticipated erection of trade barriers and stimulated by an oligopolistically 
competitive domestic market when the market leader moved to the United States and 
Europe. The decision to undertake FDI was made by Goldstar and Samsung because 
they enjoyed a firm-specific advantage in CTV production through trading off high 
labour costs in the host country with low cost Korean components. However, the Korean 
subsidiaries failed to maintain their international competitiveness in the long run. Their 
competitiveness was based on easy-to-imitate advantage- mass production capability 
- and this was the most important factor explaining Samsung's and Goldstar's 
withdrawal from their investment in the United States from the late 1980s, in stark 
contrast to their Japanese counterparts which continued production in the United States 
until the mid 1990s (see Choi and Kenney 1995). 
In the late 1980s to early 1990s, Korean electronics firms moved into the low labour cost 
economies in the ASEAN region: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The major 
motivation for this FDI was the increasing cost of home-based production due to the 
appreciation of the won and the increasing cost of Korean labour, coupled with the 
declining cost of foreign production due to low labour costs. To establish low cost supply 
bases was essential for Korean firms to produce goods for export, mainly to the 
international market, because foreign subsidiaries in the United States and Europe did not 
serve local markets well (see Chapter 4). 
As the locational advantage of Korea shifted to Southeast Asia, accompanied by changes 
in the global market, FDI by Korean firms was further developed. Following the 
establishment of plants for consumer electronics goods, major Korean component 
manufacturers began production near the assembly plants in the ASEAN region. One 
motivation for their investment was to produce cheaper components for sale to Japanese 
and Korean end-product manufacturers in the region. Their interest was also a response 





the best locational advantages so that they could concentrate their component production 
in one or two countries and supply components to other countries in the ASEAN region. 
During the 1990s, another location advantageous to Korean electronics firms was China, 
which provided a low-cost supply base with abundant cheap labour as well as having a 
large potential local market. After the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the 
Republic of Korea and China in 1992, FDI by Korean electronics firms increased 
dramatically. The twin objectives were to establish a low cost production base for the 
global market and to distribute locally made consumer electronics goods to the Chinese 
market (see Chapter 7). At the same time, FDI by component manufacturers speeded up, 
linking assemblers and component manufacturers. This was in contrast to the experience 
in the ASEAN region (see Chapter 6 and 7). There were two reasons behind the rapid 
move into China. The first was that globalisation was regarded as a crucial strategy by 
major Korean electronics firms seeking to regain their declining international competitive 
advantage. The second was that international management capability, which was not well 
established at the time of FDI in Southeast Asia, improved significantly although it 
remained weak relative to that of Japanese MNCs. 
From mid 1995, another change taking place in the ASEAN region was that Korean end-
product subsidiaries expanded their plant for the production of consumer electronics 
goods for local markets. The motivation behind this FDI was that local demand increased 
in the ASEAN region. This also occurred in China as the domestic market was opened 
more widely to foreign producers there 
Elements determining the success or failure of international 
production for new MNCs 
Firms from developing countries that have been successful in achieving international 
competitiveness in the export stage of production in their home country often fail to 
survive when they go into international production in industrialised countries.1 Failure 
1 In the early 1990s Samsung and Goldstar, which had been internationally competitive until the late 
1980s, closed their CTV manufacturing plants in New Jersey and Alabama in the US (Choi and Kenny 
1995). In 1993 Hyundai Motors closed its automobile manufacturing plant in Canada (Wall Street 
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in international production by new MNCs reflects the weak nature of their technological 
capabilities, a small and temporary ownership advantage, which can evaporate quickly 
when the competitive environment changes. Samsung's case reveals that the requirement 
for maintaining a global competitive edge has shifted from mass production capability to 
product change capability. This is a result of the need for firms to meet changing 
customers' needs both globally and locally. As global competition has accelerated, 
Korean electronics firms have been forced to compete with Japanese, American and 
European MNCs, technologically strong players operating in the same host countries (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
Four factors are relevant to the success or failure in international production by a new 
MNC. 
Firstly, the faster production capability in a specific location is learned, the better the 
growth performance of a foreign subsidiary. Given the fact that production capability 
only confers a small and temporary advantage, the timing of the exploitation of that 
advantage is critical. If capability learning and transfer is tardy, the advantage can 
evaporate. Shortening the learning process is all the more important when the capability 
gap between competitors narrows. Overall, the Chinese subsidiaries outperformed 
Samsung's Southeast Asian subsidiaries; the former succeeded in producing end-products 
and components while the latter succeeded only in producing components (see Chapters 
6 and 7). More specifically, the Chinese CTV subsidiary outperformed Samsung's 
Thailand CTV subsidiary. The learning of production capability by the Chinese 
subsidiaries was faster than that of Samsung's Southeast Asian subsidiaries because 
Samsung's new management movement under which top management pushed affiliated 
firms to undertake rapid internationalisation, particularly after 1993 and because China's 
partners had a strong resource base in related activities. 
Journal, 4 March 1994), although the company had gained international competitiveness through its 
exports from Korea. Most Taiwanese fmns that have invested in Europe and the United States have 
failed. In 1991 Acer' s microcomputer manufacturing in the United States experienced heavy losses; so 
did the state-owned Singapore Technology Holdings Corporation which made wafers for integrated 
circuits in the US in 1992 (Hu 1995:85). 
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Secondly, an end-product subsidiary that links quickly with local component suppliers 
outperforms one that does not. There are many benefits in the purchase of components 
near to production subsidiaries: transportation and warehouse costs can be reduced; a JIT 
(Just in Time) production system can be introduced due to the short delivery time; it is 
easier to respond to demands for product modification and development and the risk of 
adverse effects of changes in the host government's tariff policy is removed. The 
Thailand-based CTV plant was not able to utilise its assembly plant optimally due to the 
weakness of its links with SEM Thailand and SED Malaysia, core component producers, 
in the early stage of operations (see Chapter 6). In contrast, the China-based VCR and 
CTV plants were able to utilise their plant capacity maximally, quickly linking with local 
affiliated and/or non-affiliated component suppliers (see Chapter 7). One of the main 
reasons that international production by Samsung and Goldstar in the United States was 
unsuccessful was their failure to establish links with local component suppliers in good 
time (see Chapter 4). 
Thirdly, the more proficient the international management capability gained through 
interaction in a foreign locations with similar characteristics, the better is the performance 
of subsidiaries. Technological capabilities gained within a certain country need 
modification and adaptation when applied to a different country because country-specific 
factors such as the labour market, culture, skill levels and tastes are not identical. There 
is evidence to demonstrate this point: Samsung and Goldstar moved to the United States 
with little international production experience and eventually withdrew their investment 
(see Chapter 4), while Matsushita moved to the United States with experience gained in a 
country near the United States and is still operating there (see Chapter 4 and Choi and 
Kenney 1995). Japanese subsidiaries operating in the ASEAN region outperform their 
Korean counterparts partly because the international management capability of Japanese 
firms in Southeast Asia superior to that of Korean firms (see Chapter 6). A comparison 
of the early stage of Samsung' s operations in the ASEAN region with that in China, 
shows that the Chinese subsidiaries have generally outperformed the ASEAN 
subsidiaries. The better performance by the Chinese subsidiaries is due partly to 
Samsung's improved international operation capability, which also benefited from prior 
experience in Southeast Asia. 
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Finally, foreign subsidiaries with superior product change capability outperform those 
with an inferior capability. This is because market conditions are not static but dynamic. 
As product life cycles and consumer preferences change continuously, so products need 
to change accordingly. Comparison between Japanese and Korean firms in the United 
States in Chapter 4 provides evidence relevant to this point. Matsushita's US CTV plant 
was successful in introducing high end-products to US customers because it entered the 
United States market with relatively high product change capability. In contrast, 
Samsung and Goldstar's CTV plants failed to introduce products relevant to US 
customers' preferences because both companies had only limited capability in design and 
product development at the time they established CTV plants in the United States. In 
Southeast Asia, Matsushita's Malaysian CTV plant outperformed Samsung's CTV plant 
in Thailand. The former's product change capability was superior to that of the latter, 
although both were established at about the same time, in the late 1980s (see Chapter 6). 
Samsung's firm-specific advantage in Southeast Asia and China is its mass production 
capability in the manufacture of standardised products. The growth rates of the end-
product and component subsidiaries differed: end-product subsidiaries did not utilise their 
plant capacity maximally, while the component subsidiaries made optimal use of their 
plants, achieving economies of scale. The high growth of component manufacturers was 
due to two factors. The fust was that component subsidiaries were able to specialise in 
low end standardised products that were not generally manufactured by Japanese 
competitors; this point did not apply to the end-product subsidiaries. The second was that 
most of the component subsidiaries were wholly owned firms so that the speed of 
capability learning and exploitation was greater than that of end-product subsidiaries, 
which are all joint venture companies. 
From the viewpoint of the subsidiaries of new MNCs in Southeast Asia and China, what 
is a desirable innovation strategy to cope with increasing global competition? Given the 
fact that the global competitive environment is a mixture of capability-based and cost-
based competition, if a new MNC focuses on short-term cost minimising efforts without 
improving its technological capabilities, it is difficult to achieve long-term 
competitiveness. The case of Samsung suggests that foreign subsidiaries operating in 
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developing East Asian countries should at least upgrade their product and process change 
capability, allowing for a flexible response to changes in local and international markets 
and to the R&D strategies by established MNCs. Given the current competitive 
environment in the region, capability in product adaptation and differentiation is essential 
for the maintenance of international competitiveness. Thus, it is desirable for a new MNC 
to decentralise or internationalise headquarters' R&D activities. 
FDI policies and technology diffusion of developing countries in 
the Asia Pacific region 
Samsung's rapid growth in the 1980s (see Chapter 4) was one of the foundations of 
Korea's high economic development during the period. The Samsung case suggests that 
growth was based on the achievement of cost efficiencies through economies of scale, 
largely due to an export oriented strategy. 
Cost efficiencies were achieved in two ways. The first was dynamic production 
capability. The capability gained from the production of black and white TV sets during 
the 1970s was applied to the manufacture of CTVs, and later to microwave ovens and 
VCRs, mainly through mass production capability. Foreign technology licences provided 
firms with up-to-date techniques useful for efficient production. The second is OEM. 
Through OEM, manufacturers saved on the capital investment which would have been 
necessary for the establishment of their own international marketing channels and R&D 
investment. 
A key to the continual improvement of Samsung' s production capability was the 
intensive training of shop-front technicians, regardless of whether they were located in-
house or overseas. New skills and techniques, that is 'easy-to-imitate' capability, could be 
learnt and improved through training, and these were applied to the manufacture of more 
technologically advanced products (see Chapters 3 and 4). Samsung's case supports 
Kim's argument (1990: 156) that without training and human resource development, 
Korea's economic development would have been much retarded. 
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Samsung's declining international competitive advantage between 1989 and 1992 
indicates that it lacked 'difficult-to-imitate' capabilities such as design and development 
and experience in international operation (see Chapter 5). Although there may be several. 
explanatory factors, it can be argued that Korea's restrictive policies on inward and 
outward FDI were one of the major barriers to learning and improving on product change 
and international management capability. 
Kogut and Zander (1993: 637) draw the important lesson that 'the less codifiable and the 
harder to teach is the technology, the more likely the transfer will be to wholly-owned 
operations'. Because of this, a firm with a difficult-to-imitate capability prefers wholly-
owned subsidiaries to joint ventures. The restriction of inward foreign investment flow 
by Korea (Lall1990:13) tended to discourage foreign companies from setting up wholly-
owned subsidiaries, while encouraging joint ventures. This restrictive FDI policy deprived 
Korean firms of the chance to learn and improve on design and product development 
capability from foreign firms operating in Korea. At the firm level, the lack of product 
change capability remains as great a constraint on Samsung's growth in the 1990s as it 
was during the 1970s and the 1980s (see Chapter 5). OEM is one of the major factors 
that led Samsung to neglect improvement in design and product development (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). At a national level, Korea's restrictive inward FDI policy deterred 
Korea from the development of country-specific technological capabilities necessary to 
maintain the nation's dynamic comparative advantage. 
Another impediment to Korean firms' acqusition of international management capability 
was Korea's restrictive outward FDI policy. Given that a new MNC has a small and 
temporary advantage compared with that of established MNCs, a new MNC needs to 
exploit its advantage rapidly whenever it occurs. This is because 'competition among 
firms is based upon their differential capabilities, and their abilities to expand by the 
creation and replication of new knowledge faster than the imitative and innovation efforts 
of competitors' (Kogut and Zander 1993). 
One of the major reasons for the decline in the growth of major Korean electronics firms 
in the 1990s was the bottleneck which developed in capability learning and transfer 
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between headquarters and the Southeast Asian subsidiaries (see Chapter 6; Ernst 1994b). 
Tardy internationalisation by Korean electronics firms was also a result of the 
government's regulatory FDI policy. It was not until 1986 that government regulations 
on Korea's outward FDI began to be relaxed (see Ryou and Song 1993: 4), but gaining a 
foreign investment permit was still not easy because of the complicated formalities 
required. While Japanese firms rushed to establish low cost export production bases in 
Southeast Asia soon after the 1985 Plaza Accord, it was only in 1989 that Korean firms 
were able to begin production there (see Chapter 6). In consequence, the mass 
production capability advantage of the Korean firms was not exploited in low labour cost 
countries in a timely manner. 
A restrictive inward FDI policy can positively encourage indigenous firms to develop 
their own technological capabilities. However, a lesson from Korea's policies on inward 
foreign direct investment is that the restrictive FDI policy in a developing country 
eventually impedes the development of firm-and country-specific technological 
capabilities by hindering the acquisition and development of up-to-date technology from 
foreign firms. This has a negative effect on the maintenance of domestic firms' 
international competitive advantage to meet the need for the design and product 
development capabilities demanded by the forces of international competition. The 
process of deregulating FDI policy needs to respond quickly to changing competitive 
environments in order to attract foreign firms that will assist the development of the host 
countries' technological capabilities. Given increasing global competition, the faster their 
inward FDI policy is deregulated, the faster host countries can learn and upgrade their 
technological capabilities. Similarly, the faster outward FDI policy is deregulated, the 
more effectively can host countries' firms maintain international competitiveness because 
of the timely exploitation of their ownership advantages overseas. 
Concluding remarks 
Looking at the dynamics of a new MNC's intemationalisation provides insights into 
strategies whereby new MNCs establish a competitive edge in the face of global 
competition, and policies whereby developing countries can maintain economic growth 
and technological development in the long run. 
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Cost reduction and foreign technology acquisition are two of the major motivations for 
FDI by a new MNC, particularly a technology-intensive manufacturing firm with a large 
export share and foreign sources of technology. FDI in Southeast Asia and China sought 
to establish low cost supply bases, under domestic pressure and pressure in the host 
countries. The FDI strategy of a new MNC varies over time, but gradually evolves to 
establish regionally integrated production bases as a means of maintaining an 
internationally competitive position in relation to that of established MNCs. 
A new MNC's strength in FDI initially lies in the production of standardised components 
through the achievement of economies of scale by utilising its mass production capability. 
The success or failure of international production depends on whether or not foreign 
subsidiaries can quickly improve the production capability transferred from headquarters. 
Another element which determines the rate of growth of a foreign subsidiary is the 
development of 'difficult-to-imitate' technological capability such as product change 
capability, international management capability and linkages to local component 
suppliers. 
A new MNC's weakness in product change and international management capability is a 
major handicap in the maintenance of international competitiveness and is in part 
attributable to home country policy. Restrictive policies on inward FDI ultimately 
discouraged wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries from operating in Korea. This prevented 
Korean firms from learning difficult-to-imitate technological capabilities in design and 
product development skills, for example. Korea's regulation of outward FDI policy also 
discouraged firms from investing overseas, and ultimately inhibited domestic firms from 
gaining international production experience. This carries the important policy lesson for 
developing countries that a restrictive FDI policy, whether on inward or outward foreign 
direct investment, deprives domestic firms of the chance to learn difficult-to-imitate 
capabilities and inhibits the timely exploitation of short-lived advantages in international 
production given that international market changes rapidly and product change capability 
is more important in the face of global competition. 
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Limitations of the study and future research directions 
The study includes consideration of international business, strategic management and 
technological and organisational learning issues. It provides insights into ways of 
organising successful international production by new MNCs in the face of global 
competition. The study has the usual limitations of case studies based on data from a 
single firm in a particular country. Although major Korean electronics firms have similar 
patterns of development and similar problems in global competition, the findings may not 
be easily extended to other Korean MNCs or to new MNCs from other countries. 
Because of lack of data, it was not possible to compare systematically the performance of 
Samsung and a Japanese MNC, or to make comparisons between Samsung's operations 
in China and Southeast Asia. The performance of subsidiaries is measured by plant 
utilisation ratio without consideration of other factors. Samsung' s CTV plant is 
compared with Japan's Matsushita CTV plant despite the fact that the former is located 
in Thailand whereas the latter is located in Malaysia. Similarly, Samsung's performance in 
China is not compared with that of Japanese MNCs, but with Samsung's subsidiaries in 
ASEAN. These limitations affect the strength of the conclusions that are able to be 
drawn. 
An additional limitation is that it was not possible to evaluate fully the results of the 1993 
Samsung' s new management movement. The evaluation of Samsung' s experience is 
based on interviews and the growth performance of Samsung's subsidiaries in ASEAN 
and China. 
There is an expanding macro-level literature on the spread of newly industrialised 
countries' investment to ASEAN and China. However, the micro-level literature is thin, 
and research related to global competition is rare. One possible direction for future 
research would be to undertake more case studies and to take a more theoretical 
approach linking traditional FDI (which is static in character) with the dynamic of 
involvement of new MNCs in rapidly changing international markets, taking further the 
theme in this thesis of the key role of technological capability and its international 
diffusion. This could capitalise on the insights provided by the present study which are 
232 
informed by an interest in strategic management, organisational and technological 
learning. In this way, the findings of this study could be related to more traditional 
economic theory surrounding foreign direct investment The development of research in 
this direction could assist in the development of corporate strategies and national policy 
perspectives in developing countries. This study provides a stepping stone towards this 
broader research agenda. 
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